INDIAN ARMY COMMISSION.

REPORT

MAJOR-GENERAL HANCOCK.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.

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1859.

BOMBAY BRANCH
OF THE
Royal Asiatic Society.

Sir, London, 5th March 1859.

Having been unable to concur in the opinions recorded in their Report by the Commission on the re-organization of the Indian Army, of which I am a member, with respect to some points of the inquiry, and having deemed it necessary to report upon others on which my colleagues have passed no opinion, but which appear to me to be of the greatest importance, I have considered it my duty to follow the precedent of the Army Purchase Commission, and to record my own views and opinions thereon in a separate Report, which I have the honour herewith to transmit to you, and to request the favour of your submitting to Her Majesty the Queen.

I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your most obedient and humble Servant,
H. HANCOCK, Major-Gen.,
Bombay Army.

The Right Hon. the Secretary of State for War, Pall Mall.

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REPORT OF MAJOR-GENERAL HANCOCK.

TO THE QUEEN'S MOST EXCELLENT MAJESTY.

In obedience to Your Majesty's commands, I have applied myself to the inquiry, instituted by the Commission appointed by Your Majesty, into the organization of the Indian Army, and to the consideration of the changes which it would be expedient to make in the existing system of its organization and government. I have done so under a deep sense of the importance and responsibility of the duty entrusted to me, and with an earnest desire to perform it faithfully.

As my own opinions upon some points of the inquiry are opposed to those recorded by the Commission, and as no opinion has been passed by my colleagues on many matters which appear to me to be entirely within the scope of the inquiry, and of the greatest possible importance, as regards the future organization of an Army for India, I have considered it my duty to submit my views upon the whole subject in a separate Report. It will be seen, however, from the Minutes of Evidence, and from the papers thereto appended, that the opinions which I have formed, and the changes which I advocate, accord generally with the views and opinions of some of the most eminent of Your Majesty's civil and military servants both in England and India; and I feel, therefore, the less hesitation in offering them for Your Majesty's consideration.

As the Local European and Native troops in each Presidency are united in one army, they will necessarily be referred to together in some parts of this Report; but in order to simplify its arrangement I shall treat of the two forces separately as far as practicable.

The terms should be those specified in Clause LVI. of the "Act for the better Government of India," dated the 2nd August 1858, which I understand as guaranteeing to the officers and soldiers now belonging to Your Majesty's Indian forces, "The like Pay, "Pensions, Allowances, and Privileges, and the like Advantages, as regards Promotion "and otherwise, as if they had continued in the Service of the said Company."

The terms on which the army of the East India Company is to be transferred to the Crown.

The weight of authority, as well as argument, appears to me to be decidedly in favour of henceforward maintaining a large European Local force in India, with an equal or smaller force from the Line. Lords Ellenborough and Canning, the former and present eminent Governors-General, take this view, as do also by far the greater number of the civil and military officers of Indian experience who have been consulted; and from the tenor of the opinions recorded in paragraph 32 of his Minute, dated 5th February 1856, the late Governor-General, Lord Dalhousie, who has been prevented by illness from complying with a request made by the Commissioners to be favoured with his views upon the several subjects of the inquiry, may be counted on the same side.

How far the European portion of the Army should be composed of troops of the Line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service, and how far of troops raised for service in India only.

4073.

For partly Line and partly Local troops.

Lord Ellenborough.	Sir F. Abbott.
Lord Canning.	Sir W. O. E. Mansfield.
Lord Harris.	Major-General Birch.
Mr. J. P. Willoughby.	Br.-General J. Jacob.
Sir R. J. P. Vivian.	Colonel Melvill.
Sir H. Somerset.	Colonel Holland.
Sir P. Grant.	Colonel Mayhew.
Sir J. Outram.	Lt. Colonel Durand.
Sir J. Lawrence.	

On the other hand are to be ranked Lord Elphinstone, Sir George Clerk, and many officers of distinction of the Line in India and England; but as regards the military officers, setting aside on either part the natural prejudices of previous service as doubtless being much connected with their opinion, it may be fairly stated that while the officers of the Local army discuss matters with which their minds have been conversant from their youth, those of the Line have given but a cursory attention to the subject, and therefore are not so well qualified to pronounce an opinion on it, while one of the most eminent of the independent witnesses in favour of a Line army, Sir George Clerk, admits that "it would be an advantage to India, to the people of India, and "to the welfare of India," that the Local Government should be able still to command, as it can do only by having a Local army, the continuous service of a body of officers trained from their youth in India, and with no views beyond it.

4740, 4741.

For Line troops only.

Lord Elphinstone.
Sir G. Clerk.
Sir Willoughby Cotton.
Sir C. Trevlyan.
Sir F. H. Franks.
Sir E. Lugard.
Sir S. Cotton.
Sir A. Wilson.
Sir A. Tulloch.
Maj.-Gen. Pratt.

Descending, however, from authority to argument, the reasons for and against, adduced on either side, may be fairly summed up as follows.

Arguments in favour of a Line Army only.

3967. 4215. 4274. 5305. 4025, 4026. 4076. 4975. 1. That an army under one head and system must necessarily be better disciplined, more efficient, and more under command, than two with divers rules and systems; and that baneful jealousies, such as are said to exist at present, would cease.

3800. 3812. 3813, 3814. 4010 to 4015. 2. That troops of the Line in India have been, and are better trained and disciplined than Local troops.

4220. 4384. 4385, 4386. 4522. 4527. 3. That regiments periodically relieved are healthier than those that serve continuously in India, and that lengthened residence in that country impairs discipline, and leads to moral and physical deterioration.

4670. 4739. 6686, 6687. 3903. 4737. 4693. 4700. 4739. 4746. 4769. 4788. 5136. 5143. 5762. 4. That it is for Imperial interests that the entire field of India should be made available as a training field for the army of the Line, that no portion of the European force of England should be placed in such a position that it could not be made use of whenever required; and that the Government of England should have at all times a large force in India of trained and seasoned officers and soldiers, available for any European emergency.

5230. 5221. 5241. 5243. 5. That the disbandment of regiments of the Line raised specially to meet the Indian emergency, which the retention and consequent augmentation of the Local army would necessitate, would entail great hardship upon the officers who might be placed thereby upon half-pay, and an injustice to England in the charge that would be thus thrown upon its revenues.

Arguments in favour of a large Local Force, with an equal or smaller Force from the Line.

3781. 4067. 6065. 6082. 6113. 3793. 3800. 3812. 3813, 3814. 5151, 6581. 6689. 6691. 3834. 3839. 4115. 1. That the honourable emulation existing between two separate services, under the same general system and head, is productive of good, provided justice be done by abolishing invidious and unfair distinctions; and that no injurious difference need be apprehended in discipline, as none has hitherto been experienced.

4383–I. para. 7. 4415. 4417. 4437. 5457 to 5464. 5933 to 5940. 6148. 6269. 6274 to 6278. 6283. 2. That troops newly arrived from England are not, whether from want of local experience or of physical acclimation, or both, so equal to the hardships and exposure of an Indian campaign as those that have served for some years in India, and are to that extent less efficient.

3. That the actual mortality over a term of years of Local troops, is far less than that of Line troops in India.*

3801. 3807. 3148. 5799. 6038 to 6043. 6065. 6121. 6123. 4462, para. 2. 4480. 4. That troops of the Line are more costly than Local troops; directly owing to the necessity for periodical reliefs, and for reserves to effect them; and indirectly, from the loss of their services during the voyages to and from India; from the double acclimating they require to undergo, first on their arrival in India, and afterwards on their return to England, and from their greater mortality.

4670. 6686. 6687. 3781. 4067. 4779, 4780. 4788. 5153. 5154. 5750. 6125, 6126. 6153 to 6157. 6503, 6504. 5. That if more European troops could be maintained in India than are actually required for its protection and defence, in order that England may have the alleged advantage of that training field for her army, it would be in the highest degree unjust to tax the revenue of India for their support, and that if, on the other hand, no larger European force be maintained than is considered necessary for the safety of India, not a man could be withdrawn to meet a European or other emergency without manifest danger to that country.

5248 to 5250. 5257 to 5264. 6560, 6561. 6563, 6564. 6565. 6652. 6653. 6564. 6556. 6. That an army under one head and system of so great numerical strength as the European force in India will be in future, and placed by distance so completely beyond the control of the Home authorities, would involve the danger to the Government of general combinations against its authority in matters affecting the interests of the officers and soldiers generally; and that this danger can be guarded against in no way so effectually as by dividing the force into two armies, with sufficient separation of interest, and diversity in their systems of government, to prevent their being drawn into too close connexion; and thus providing the Government with a powerful check in each against the other to prevent any such combination.

4067, para. 4. 4166, 4167. 4171. 6089. 6099, 6100. 6532. 7. That were the whole European force composed of troops of the Line, nearly all the superior commands would be held by officers ignorant of the customs and inexperienced in the ways of the country.

4074. 4078. 4080, 4081. 8. That by converting the whole European force into a Line army,† the Government of

* Adjutant General's returns, dated Horse Guards, 23 September and 18 November 1858. India House return, dated 14 December 1858.

† Sir W. R. Mansfield's Report, Chap. IV.

India would be deprived of the advantage of having at its entire disposal a large body of officers trained from their youth in India, and with no views beyond it, and consequently devoting all their energies and abilities to its interests. 4096. 4165. 4740, 4741. 4742 5126. 5236. 5272 to 5275. 6143. 6169. 6170.

9. That converting the entire European force of India into a Line army, would leave the officers of the Native army necessarily a small and depressed service, while, if the officers of that service are to be drawn from regiments of the Line, such officers, from not having been trained from their youth with Native soldiers, and not being bound to continuous service with them, would be, on the whole, unqualified for the efficient discharge of so delicate and dangerous a duty. 4096. 4195 to 4198 5255. 6065. 4193, 4194. 4201.

10. That as the officers and soldiers of the Local army have borne their full share in the work of putting down the mutiny in India, they have a fair claim to share, equally with the officers of the Line, in the advantages of promotion consequent upon the augmentation of the permanent European force which recent events have rendered necessary; and that no injustice would be thereby done to those officers of the Line who might be placed in consequence upon half-pay, nor to England by the charge upon that account, which would fall upon its revenue; while, as the reduction of the troops of the Line now serving in India must necessarily be a work of time, very many of those officers would be absorbed by promotion, retirement, and death; and, as regards the men, the entire excess would be gradually absorbed by the Local regiments to be raised, by the operation of the ten years' enlistment bill, and by invaliding and death. 2418 to 2420. 5245. 5520. 4134. 5240. 5244. 5412. 5413. 4103. 5125. 5231. 5239. 5346 to 5349.

11. That it is essential to the safety of India to have the principal portion of its permanent European force localised, and so rendered not liable to be withdrawn by the Home Government to meet a European or other emergency.* 3901. 4067. 4073. 5126. 5722. 5789. 5794. 6065.

Comparative efficiency of Line and Local troops.

With respect to the conversion of the whole European force in India into a Line army, the argument that one unbroken and undivided system is necessarily superior to two, as regards efficiency and discipline, is a matter that can at once be removed from the vague domain of opinion, and brought to the test of experience and fact. The universal testimony of officers of the Line who have served with the Local troops in India is to the effect, that they are as good soldiers in the field as their own men; and, although some have asserted and others hinted that their conduct in quarters is not so good, the comparative record of mortality for a long course of years shows that they are the best lives. The ultimate object of discipline is to make soldiers fight well, and, as an essential to this end, that they should preserve their health; if, therefore, the Local troops, under the heavy disadvantage of a paucity of officers, which might well account for some occasional looseness of conduct, have fought as well, and preserved their health better than the troops of the Line, I may well pass unnoticed general allegations of want of discipline, which are contradicted by the testimony of other witnesses of at least equal experience. For my own part, after many years of observation, I have failed to discern any superiority of one service over the other. I have seen in both every variety of discipline, according to the amount of temptation, and to the character of the commanding officer, but quite as much irregularity in the one as in the other. 2907 to 2912. 2985 to 2627. 2989. 2990. 2993. 2995. 2999. 3000. 3002. 4238. 5438 to 5441. 3793. 3812. 3814. 4118. 4119. 4120. 4649. 4650. 4763. 5151.

The appearance on the parade ground of a regiment lately arrived from England is undoubtedly more striking than that of one of the Local regiments. Officers and men are fitted with tighter and better made coats, are ruddier, fresher looking, and better "set up," with an air of smartness and precision in their movements, which, in the eyes of civilians and martinets, contrast favourably with the somewhat rough and ready, and sallow visaged officers and soldiers of the Local corps. Take, however, the two regiments on the line of march, or on field service, and the apparent superiority disappears; and it is found that many of the habits, and traditionary customs and ways, that offend the eye of the barrack-yard disciplinarian, are beneficial to health, and consequently to efficiency. 4383–I. para. 7. 4415. 4418. 4419. 4421. 4494.

Tried, then, by the tests of efficiency for service in the field, and of service in the field actually rendered, the fact is placed beyond dispute, that the Local troops have not been, and are not, inferior in any respect to the troops of the Line. Nothing could well be stronger than the testimony given on this point by several of the most distinguished officers of the Line army, as the result of their own experience, and which I shall here transcribe, together with that of Lord Ellenborough, on the same subject.

* Paragraph 32 of Minute by Lord Dalhousie, Governor-General of India, dated 5th February 1856.

Questions.	Answers.		
	Sir T. F. Franks.	*Sir Willoughby Cotton.*	*Lord Ellenborough.*
Have the European artillery and infantry of the East India Company's army been found in any respect inferior as regards efficiency for service in the field, to the artillery and infantry of the Royal army?	4222. "I have served in the field with portions of the European forces of artillery and infantry of the three Presidencies, and nothing could surpass their gallantry, efficiency, and intelligence."	4618. "No, I have never found them so. In the field, I do not think it is possible that there should be a more efficient force than the Indian artillery."	6684. "As far as I am aware, never. I believe not. All Commanders-in-Chief have spoken in admiration of the artillery; they have said that they have never seen any artillery superior to that of the Company."
Have the officers on the staff of the army in India, and belonging to the East India Company's forces been found in any respect inferior, as regards efficiency for service in the field, to the officers on the staff of Her Majesty's army, whether in Europe or in India?	4239. "Certainly not."	4619. "Certainly not; I do not think it is possible to have better staff officers than the Indian army had."	6685. "Not that I am aware of. They have had greater advantages. The officers of the Company's army have acquired a much more extensive knowledge; in fact, the probability is, that in former times, till this great revolution took place, the officers of the Company's army would have been, as soldiers, superior to the officers of the Queen' army. They had seen a great deal more; they had more enlarged minds, because they had a great deal more to do."
Have the European officers and soldiers of the East India Company's army ever failed to uphold, equally with those of the Royal army, the honour of their Queen and country, when employed in the field?		4620. "In every action in which I have been connected with the Honourable Company's troops, I never found either Europeans or natives behave in any way but in the most gallant manner."	6688. "I believe not. The European regiments in the Company's service have noble records of their achievements. I believe they have done their duty as well as any troops ever did."

There is, besides, the testimony of the late Duke of Wellington and Sir Charles James Napier, as afforded in the following extract from the evidence given by Lord Ellenborough.

6581. "Sir Charles Napier had the highest opinion of the European regiments in the "Company's service."

6689. "The Duke of Wellington told me that the English army in India came nearer his "idea of what the Roman legions were than any troops which he had ever seen in his "life. I recollect particularly his saying so, and I do not think that he confined his "remark to the Europeans; but that, as an army, there was no army superior to the "English army in India."

6688. Above all, there is the testimony of those "noble records of their achievements," referred to by Lord Ellenborough, which is afforded in the honorary distinctions they have gained, as exhibited in the Army Lists of three Presidencies, and which will well bear comparison with those of their comrades of the Line army.

Jealousies between the Line and Local armies. 4464. 4466. 4467. 6555. 6065. 6113.

In regard to jealousies, it is not to be denied that they have existed to some extent between the Line and Local armies in India, but no one has ventured to suggest that they have ever interfered with the zealous and efficient performance of duty. Still such jealousies are, I admit, an evil which it is desirable to do away with, and this can be done effectually by the Government simply doing justice to both armies. If, hitherto, the officers of the Line have had the one disadvantage of being excluded from the various detached appointments annexed to the Indian service, those of the Local army have had many disadvantages in exclusion from, or unequal participation in, benefits enjoyed by the former. It is a fact, that until within the last two years, the Local army has never had a Commander-in-chief, even of a minor Presidency, selected from its ranks; and a return from the East India House, dated November 1858, shows that while, before the mutiny, the number of Line to Local regiments and battalions was as 1 to 8·4, and the establishment of officers was as 1 to 5·1; the commands of divisions were in the proportion of 5 to 11, or as 1 to 2·2, and that the brigade commands, although more equally shared, were still not given in proportion to numbers. Further, the entire history of the Indian Army is one continual struggle to obtain equal rights and honours with the Line Army, as shown in the following instances:

App. p. 28.

4184. 4186. 4187. 6111. 6112.

1788. 1. Queen's commissions were first granted to the officers of the East India Company's Army in - - - - - - - - 1788

2. The rank of lieutenant-general was not granted to them until 1813

3. The Order of the Bath, although nominally extended to them in 1815, was not virtually conferred until - - - - - - 1826
4. Brevets for service were not granted to them until - - - 1828
5. The rank of general was not granted to them until - - - 1837
6. The appointment of "aide-de-camp" to the Queen was not extended to them until - - - - - - - - - 1842
7. Their rank as officers holding the Queen's commission was not recognized in Europe until - - - - - - - - - 1855
8. The first appointment ever made of an officer of the East India Company's Army to a command-in-chief in India was made in - - - 1856

Under these circumstances it is not to be wondered at that jealousies should have existed hitherto, but let all such causes for them be removed, and they will be replaced by an honourable emulation to excel, which is a feeling it is desirable to foster, rather than to stifle.

Comparative healthiness of Line and Local troops. 4527. 6020. 6021. 6035. 6037.

One of the witnesses*, an officer of high reputation as a military statistician, has endeavoured to show that regiments of the Line periodically relieved are healthier than those that serve continuously in India. Although opinions, entitled to respect, differ as to the alleged fact of a residence in India giving the constitution any immunity from disease by means of physical acclimation, it is yet admitted that the experience which residence confers enables soldiers to do and to avoid many things beneficial or hurtful, and thus that the moral acclimation, if it may be so called, saves health and life, while the want of it is a fertile source of disease and death.† A comparative table of mortality of regiments of the Line during their first year of service in India shows that in those which have arrived direct from England the mortality is 11·0 per cent., while in those which have been seasoned (morally or physically) in the quasi-tropical climates of the Cape of Good Hope and of Australia, it is only 4·8 and 7·8 respectively, a strong confirmation of the prevailing belief that "seasoning" is essential to the preservation of health in new climates; and I may here adduce, as a further proof, the fact stated by the eminent medical authority, Dr. Martin, that regiments returning to England require two or three years' residence before they are as fit for work in our cold climate as those who have never quitted it, and that the mortality in them for that period is in excess of that in regiments on home service.

4383–I. para. 7. 4415 to 4419.

4462–I. para. 2. 4479, 4480. 4481.

App. p. 30.

In a return by the Adjutant-General, dated 23rd Sept. 1858, it is stated, in order to account for a somewhat larger proportion of casualties shown in the Queen's than in the Company's European forces, that the number of men who purchase their discharge from the Queen's army in India is considerably larger than in the Company's; and in support of this allegation the number of discharges purchased in the years 1843 and 1848 by the infantry of the two armies is adduced, showing 46 Queen's against 3 Company's in the former year, and 65 against 12 in the latter.

Admitting the fact, I may state that numbers without proportion prove nothing; and it may be as well to point out that, by the rule of proportion, if 46 Queen's soldiers, out of an average of 27,000, bought their discharges in 1843, not quite 8 Company's soldiers (in lieu of 3) out of an average of 5,000 should have done so to make an equality, while by the same rule, in the year 1848, not quite 14 Company's soldiers should have purchased their discharges in lieu of 12.

The total number of casualties shown in this return are given per cent.: Queen's troops 9·8, Company's troops 9·4; and it is sought to explain this difference in masses, averaging 27,000 and 5,000 respectively, by the above infinitesimal effect, and by a suggestion that "some of the men, also of Her Majesty's regiments, have, perhaps, served "seven or eight years before they are sent to India. The men sent to the Company's "regiments are all recruits." But the total number of "casualties" in the Company's army as given in this return is made up not only of deaths, invalids, and discharged men, as in the Queen's Army, but of men placed on the "non-effective list," that is, employed in various civil and military capacities away from their regiments, but liable to be returned to them, and not legitimately included as "casualties." If they be struck off

* Horse Guards and India House returns, showing the number of men in Line and Local regiments, of ages varying from under 20 to 40 years and upwards. App. p. 32.

† Adjutant-General's return, showing mortality in regiments arrived in India from England, Australia, and Cape of Good Hope, dated 18 November 1858. App. p. 31.

the return, the proportion of casualties in the Company's infantry will be reduced from 9·4 to 8·7, or more than one per cent. less than in the Queen's infantry.

After all, the proportion of deaths, provided it cover adequate numbers and time, is the conclusive test of comparative healthiness. Those in the infantry for the ten years shown in the Adjutant-General's return are 6·3 per cent. in the Queen's, and 5·6 in the Company's troops; and if we take the mortality in the whole of the Queen's troops in India for a period of fifteen years, as shown in the Adjutant-General's return, dated 18th November last, we find it to be 5·8 per cent., while by a return* (not quite complete) from the East India House, dated 14th December 1858, for the same period the mortality of the entire Company's army appears to be only about 4 per cent.; or in other figures, if the 456,643 men of the Line who have served in India in the last fifteen years, had been of Local in lieu of Line regiments, the actual mortality, instead of having been 26,535 men, would have amounted to 18,265.

App. p. 31. App. p. 34.

Sir A. Tulloch has taken great exception to the results of these returns,† and has endeavoured to show that the Queen's troops in India have suffered more by war and pestilence than the Company's; and that if these extraordinary causes are eliminated, the balance of life, in one Presidency at least, will be in favour of the former. If any difference by actual death in battle can be shown, which I doubt to any appreciable extent, the correction may be admitted; but in regard to sickness, it must be evident that, taking large bodies of troops serving in the same climate in a long course of years, the causes must on the whole be equal; while, as an instance of the danger of making arbitrary corrections in returns, I may point to the case of erroneous mortality in the 78th Highlanders, which Sir A. Tulloch proposes to omit from the returns as caused by sickness following the campaign in Scinde. The 78th did not serve in the campaign, and its extraordinary sickness was caused by an injudicious march at a sickly season, and may reasonably be set down as arising from local inexperience, a fertile source of disease and death in the Line troops as distinguished from the Local army.

3968. 3970. 3971, 3976. 3980. 4220. 4227. 4229. 4234. 3793. 3800. 3819. 4494. 6270, 6271. 6625. App. p. 29.

With respect to the alleged deterioration of discipline in regiments from a lengthened service in India, it is remarkable that the only instances adduced from their own experience by the witnesses who have expressed opinions that such is the general consequence, go rather to prove the contrary; and, although mentioned by them as exceptions to the rule, force upon the mind a very strong conviction (which the testimony of other witnesses confirms) that after all, if well commanded, no length of residence in India can impair the discipline of a regiment. A return by the Adjutant-General, dated Horse Guards, 12th Oct. 1858, showing the comparative numbers of soldiers of the Line army tried by courts-martial in India and elsewhere from 1849 to 1854, favours the same conclusion; the average per annum on the six years showing the following proportions:—

In India - - - -	1 in 25
Elsewhere - - - -	1 in 14

Admitting it to be the fact, however, it affords no valid argument against maintaining a Local army, because as in that of the Line, all recruits for the former are now enlisted for ten years only, and it rests entirely with the Government to re-enlist them or not for further periods of service.

Comparative cost of Line and Local troops.

3810.

With respect to the comparative cost of troops of the Line and Local troops, the argument that the former are more costly than the latter is borne out by this fact, that in regiments raised in India, although the *men* are, in the first instance, sent out from England at the cost of the State, in like manner as the men of the Line regiment, yet the *officers* find their passages at their own expense, and that the first cost to the State once paid is never renewed, while in Line regiments it recurs every ten or twelve years. The charges for drafts to keep up the strength may be assumed to be nearly the same in both cases, and therefore need not be referred to. Again, if we suppose that the troops of the Line in India, heretofore amounting to 22,000 or 24,000 men, say, 24 regiments requiring relief every ten years, or 2½ regiments per annum, are to be increased to a permanent total of 70,000 or 80,000 men, say, 80 regiments, eight regiments per annum would be required in order to carry out a decennial relief, or at least five more than the number now required

* The result of this return, as furnished by the courtesy of the Statistical Department of the East India House, is as follows:—"Taking the three Presidencies together, the only periods that can be properly combined are the four years from 1847 to 1850, "and the two years 1852 and 1853. In the former period the average is 4·22, in the latter 4·40. Combining the entire statement "for the two years given for Bengal, the 13 for Madras, and 10 for Bombay, the result is an average of 3·99."

† Observations on the returns of mortality in the Queen's and Company's troops in India, by Sir A. Tulloch, dated War Office, January 1859. App. p. 38.

for that purpose. Further, these five regiments would be added to the actual cost, but merely nominal strength of the army in England, for, in order to carry out the relief with due regard to the fittest season for arrival in India, they must be sent from England in August to arrive in November, while the relieved regiments, which (the European force being kept at a minimum) could not be spared until their arrival, would embark in November to arrive in March, or, if due regard be had to their health, would embark in January to arrive in May, thus giving but three months service to the country in return for their cost; while, if the alleged facts be correct, that troops making a change from temperate to tropical climates, and vice versâ, require two or three years seasoning before they are fully competent for work. It is evident there must be an enormous loss of service and power in thus carrying out a costly and unnecessary system of reliefs. 4505. 5921.

Sir. A. Tulloch (answer 4529) enters into some elaborate calculations relative to the cost of transport of troops to and from India, from which and from a detailed return furnished from the India House of the comparative cost of Line and Local regiments, I shall take leave to borrow some results, merely assuming, in accordance with the views of every competent witness except Sir. A. Tulloch himself, that the Cape route must hereafter necessarily be the main line for effecting reliefs, that by Egypt being availed of only for small bodies and on special occasions. App. p. 44. 4075. 4660. 4662. 4781. 6284 to 6294.

Supposing the future European army in India to be fixed at 80,000 men of all arms, the difference of cost for transport alone if they are all troops of the Line, in lieu of being in the proportion recommended by Lord Canning, viz., artillery, all Local; cavalry and infantry, two-thirds Local, and one-third Line; say,—

Local	15,000	artillery.
	43,000	cavalry and infantry.
Line -	22,000	do. do.
Total -	80,000	

will be as follows:—"Assuming," says Sir A. Tulloch, "that one-tenth of the troops "must be relieved every year, and less it cannot be consistently with the maintenance of "efficiency," we should have to provide reliefs annually for one-tenth of 80,000 men in the one case against one-tenth of 22,000 in the other; that is to say, we should have to pay an extra transport charge for 5,800 men, or six regiments, annually, in consequence of our Indian European force being entirely from the Line. The annual charges for sending home invalids, and for drafts to replace casualties may be estimated as the same in either case, in order not to encumber the subject with details; but as the returns show much greater mortality in the Line than in Local corps, and from other causes to be hereafter noticed, it is probable that the charge for this item is much larger in the former than in the latter.

Sir A. Tulloch has assumed, as avowedly below the mark, a charge of 12*l.* per man for passage to India. The India House authorities, with more certain information, fix 14*l.*, and estimate the whole charge for sending out an entire regiment, and for bringing back two-fifths of the number at 47,862*l.* Although 5,800 men are not quite equal numerically to six infantry regiments of the Line, yet taking into account that a large part would be cavalry and artillery on larger pay, they would be financially equal to that number, making the annual extra charge for transport 47,862*l.* plus 6, or 287,172*l.* 4529, para. 3. 4529, para. 4. 4532. App. p. 44.

Sir A. Tulloch adds truly, "As the average passage of sailing vessels, unless they be "of very superior description, which would add to the expense, may be taken at about "four months; these men, though paid, would be, during all this time, available neither "for the army in the East, nor the army at home, indeed they might, so far as regards "any military purpose, *be just as well in a state of non-existence.*" 4529, para. 6.

In his subsequent evidence (answer to Q. 5983, passim), Sir A Tulloch endeavours to show that the cost of a regiment of the Line is actually less than that of a Local regiment, consequent on the difference in numbers and proportions of the officers and men of the two corps. If this statement, as regards the difference in numbers of the officers, be meant to prove that a Line regiment is necessarily cheaper than a Local regiment in respect to officers when performing the same duties, (and unless it has this meaning, it is wasting time to consider it) it is altogether fallacious. The proportion of officers in European regiments is fixed by a general rule, by which a certain number are considered necessary for the maintenance of discipline, and is the same in Line and Local regiments; but there are, in India, a vast number of appointments which it is considered are most economically

and efficiently filled by regimental officers detached from their regiments, and the "establishments" of officers of local regiments have been hitherto increased beyond the regimental requirements to meet these calls; these additional officers can, therefore, under no circumstances be considered as forming part of the regimental expenditure. If India is to be henceforth garrisoned by Line regiments, either those duties must be taken by the regimental officers, or some other agency must be found, probably more costly and less trustworthy. In the one case, the regimental establishment of officers must be increased to the same proportion as in the Local army, or discipline cannot be kept up; in the other, the cost to the State will certainly not be reduced.

5330. 5861, 5862.

The Indian "establishment" of a Line and Local regiment of infantry are as follows:—

Line Regiment.		Local Regiment.
4 Field officers.		4 Field officers.
10 Captains.		14 Captains.
20 Subalterns.		32 Subalterns, including staff.
3 Staff.		
37		50
	Deduct	14 to be employed on detached duties.
Total for Regimental duty		36

The number of *men* in a Line regiment is 1,078, and in a Local regiment 947, and this difference does, pro tanto, increase the cost of officers of Local regiments in proportion to the men as compared with a Line regiment. It is a matter which should be corrected by equalization, but it is right to mention that it originated entirely from the disability, enforced by Act of Parliament or of the Board of Control on the East India Company, to raise more men than sufficient to complete the rank and file of their regiments to the latter number.

3870. 6073 to 6078.

There is another heavy item of cost in a Line regiment over and above that of a Local regiment, viz., that of the depôt. For the Local army a general depôt establishment is kept up in England, and as many men are enlisted, equipped, and sent out as are required to keep the corps complete. For the Line, a depôt establishment of 6 officers and 230 men is kept up for each regiment. The military authorities at the India House calculate the entire depôt charge for Local regiments at 2,700*l.*, and that for a Line regiment at 7,780*l.*, but as the former consists of 947 men, while the latter has 1,078, it will be as well to add, say, 300*l.* to the charge for a Local regiment; with this addition the difference of cost amounts to 4780*l.* per regiment per annum. If, therefore, following up the preceding line of argument, we add 5,800 men of the Line to the Indian Army, in lieu of an equal number of Local troops there will be an excess of charge on account of depôts of 4,780*l.* for 58 regiments, or 277,240*l.* There is another way in which the calculation may be put, as taken from the India House return.

App. p. 45.

Cost of a Local regiment of 947 non-commissioned, rank and file -	£68,058
Deduct pay of two officers, say 1 captain and 1 subaltern, in addition to the 12 struck off for detached employ, leaving 36 for duty - -	£806
Total cost -	£67,252
Or per man - -	£71 0 $3\frac{3}{4}$
Cost of a Line regiment of 1,087 non-commissioned, rank and file - -	£85,271
Add pay of 1 major and 2 captains struck out of the return for detached employ, leaving 37 for duty - - - - - -	£1,943
Total cost -	£87,214
Or per man - -	£80 18 $0\frac{3}{4}$

Difference.

£9 17*s.* 9*d.* per man, or for 58,000 men £573,475 per annum.

The modifications I have made is simply to allow an equal proportion of officers for regimental duty. If 36 are considered as necessary for 947 men in a Local regiment, 37

are certainly not too many for 1,078 men. Were the India House estimate taken, there would be 38 officers with 947 men, and 34 officers with 1,078 men, which is a simple absurdity.

In a still later memorandum, Sir A. Tulloch has attempted to invalidate the India House* calculations by counter-statements more or less open to question, but it is unnecessary to embarrass a subject of this kind with a mass of disputable detail. The broad question we are called on to decide is, not whether this or that petty item of charge is or is not at the present time larger or smaller than it might be, on one side or the other, but whether there are or are not certain heavy charges necessarily inseparable from one side. In this view, then, it may be stated that, while there need not and should not be any difference in the numbers and proportions of men and officers for duty with a Line or Local regiment, or in any petty item of pay, establishment, or allowance, the existing more liberal scale of pensions to Local officers should not be disturbed. What the difference of charges on this head may amount to per regiment I believe it would be very difficult to form even an appropriate estimate of, seeing that the element of half pay, unknown in the Local army, would have to enter into the calculation. Even with this set-off, however, it may be admitted that the average cost of a Local regiment for pensions to the officers is more than that of a Line regiment, while, on the other hand, in the case of a Line regiment, we have the cost of transport round the Cape both ways, including under this head a large number of men,† who, having served some years before embarking for India, would be entitled under the operation of the ten-years enlistment bill to passages home at the public expense, before the return of the regiment to head quarters, requiring fresh men from home to replace them, who would in like manner return to England after a service in India of perhaps only two or three years, on their regiment being relieved. There is also the loss of service during transit, the much greater cost of regimental depôt establishments, (at whatever amount they may be fixed,) the additional cost of regiments added to the home establishment, in order to provide reserves to enable the reliefs to be carried out, and, lastly, the heavy charges caused by the much greater mortality of Line troops, as shown by the returns before referred to.

India regarded as a training field for the army of the Line.

The argument that it is for Imperial interests that a large body of troops of the Line should be kept in India, for the benefit of the training they there undergo, can only, I apprehend, be admitted within certain limitations. We profess to hold India for the good of India, and to impose on her revenues only such charges as legitimately appertain to its protection and defence. It is evident that, under this view, no troops available for Imperial purposes can be kept in India, unless at the cost of British revenues; while, assuming the necessity for double acclimation as referred to in a previous paragraph, and the delay that must occur in bringing them to Europe on an emergency, it seems more than doubtful whether it would be judicious so to keep them, quite irrespective of the cost. That India is a valuable school for officers there can be no doubt, and it is a legitimate subject for regret that in many of our European wars, the services of some of the ablest generals and staff officers England has ever produced should have been lost to the State from some technical disabilities which a stroke of the pen could have removed; but the safety of India is not to be perilled by making it a training ground of the English Army; nor in reality is there any hostility, as seems to be inferred by the tone of some of the questions put to witnesses, between Imperial and Indian interests; the tranquil possession of India is a matter of vital importance to England, and every measure which tends to ensure this possession is, in fact, an Imperial measure of the highest possible importance.

4462. Second proposition, para. 5. 4746.

6071. 6115. 6116, 6117.

School of officers afforded by a Local army.

Among the measures of the greatest consequence to this end is, as it seems to me, the continuance of the school of officers of whom Sir Henry Lawrence may be considered one of the latest and most distinguished, but who have descended to us in an unbroken series from the days of Clive to the present moment, a school formed under the peculiar circumstances alone attaching to Local service, which binds men in mind and body to the country. Very many witnesses have borne testimony to the inestimable value of such a class of officers; but one, a very eminent person, Sir George Clerk, whilst sharing this opinion, considers that the retention of a Local service even will no longer produce them, because the facilities and encouragements for resort to England have been of late years so much increased that men's minds can no longer be fixed, as in past times, on India and

6169. 6170. 6171.

4726. 4740. 4741, 4742.

* Observations on Colonel Baker's estimate of relative cost of a Line and Local regiment, App. p. 46.

† Deputy Adjutant-General's return, showing the number of men from under 2 to 18 years *service* and upwards, in the six regiments last sent to India previously to the war with Russia, dated 30 November 1858, App. p. 32.

India alone, and that therefore, in so far, it is immaterial whether a Local service is retained or not. With great and unaffected respect for Sir George Clerk's opinion on all matters, I must say his opinion on this point seems to me unsound. Admitting, for the sake of the argument, that the facilities for resort to Europe do, so far as India is concerned, injuriously unsettle the minds of Local officers, still the material hold of a service which, with the vast majority, is necessarily for life, and of which a visit to England is but an episode, is surely, at the lowest estimate, a bond of a very different nature from that which attaches the Line officer to India, the one schooled from his boyhood to look to India alone as the means and hope of success in life, the other considering it simply as an occasional tour of service. But I do not concur with Sir George Clerk that the facilities for visiting their native land of late years accorded to the Local officers are likely to be in any sense injurious. I believe, with those who framed the later regulations, that the expansion of mind and power of comparison which European furloughs afford to the observant and useful Indian officer (and with such alone are we concerned) will be of incalculable advantage to him on his return to the country of his adoption, and it is surely illogical to argue that that which benefits the individual in health and strength of body and mind renders him a worse or less efficient public officer.

Native army how to be officered.

3099, 3100. 3123 to 3127. 4036. 4277 to 4285. 4713, 4714. 4935. 5058. 6983. 4096. 4193. 4194. 4201. 4202. 6103 to 6107. 4195 to 4198. 5255, 5256.

The advocates for having no European local service in India seem to be divided in their opinions as to the manner in which the vast Native army (vast, however reduced) and police are to be officered, supposing their views to be carried out. One party contemplates retaining generally the existing system of officering the Native army as a Local army, with greater or less facilities for exchange with the Line; the other, admitting the generally received view that a large number of European officers in Native corps is unnecessary, would officer them by selection from the Line, making the position of officers so detached, as eligible as increased pay can render it. Of these plans, if our choice lay between them, I much prefer the last. It has, in my opinion, one great fault, that officers of a Line army can never, as a rule, furnish men properly qualified to command Natives;* but, if a Line European force be determined on for India, I would infinitely prefer this arrangement with all its defects to the retention of a small body of Local officers solely attached to the Native army. They would inevitably be looked down on and depressed, and, as in all such cases, would ere long sink into a condition of inferiority which would drive men of spirit and ambition into disaffection or despair.

For the reasons above stated, I am of opinion as follows:

The permanent European force in India should be composed partly of troops of the Line, taking India as part of the regular tour of service, and partly of troops raised for service in India only.

3781. 3901. 4067, paras.5,6. 4073. 4122. 5119. 5196. 5236. 5304 to 5306. 5750. 6153. 6513.

Of the minimum force that may be considered necessary to form the permanent garrison of India, after tranquillity shall have been restored, the whole of the artillery and engineers and two-thirds of the cavalry and infantry should be Local troops, and one-third of the cavalry and infantry troops of the Line.

Whatever additional European force may be required, pending the restoration of tranquillity, should be furnished from the army of the Line.

If it be considered necessary for Imperial interests to keep a body of troops of the Line in India, in excess of the minimum force deemed requisite for its protection and defence, in order that the Home Government may have such a body seasoned and practised in the field of India, available for recall at any time to meet a European emergency, the cost of that extra force should be borne mainly by the English revenue, the Indian revenue being charged only with such portion of it as may be equivalent to the saving effected by the Government of India, being enabled proportionally to reduce the amount of permanent European force.

The best means of providing for the periodical relief of the troops of the line.

If the proportion of Line to Local troops be fixed, as I have proposed, at one-third of the permanent force of cavalry and infantry, the best general mode of effecting the periodical reliefs of the former, would be that of taking up merchant vessels, as has hitherto been the practice, for their transport to India viâ the Cape. As regards infantry,

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* Minute by Sir J. Outram, 30 September 1858, "cadets," para. 2, App. p. 74.

† Adjutant-General's return, showing the mortality in regiments sent to India from the Cape of Good Hope and Australia, dated 18 November 1858, App. p. 31.

the reliefs should be formed, as far as practicable, of regiments from the Mediterranean,* the Cape, or Australia, which may have had a year or two of seasoning in the semi-tropical climates of those countries. All relieving regiments should be embarked at such time as will ensure their arriving in India, with an ordinary passage, in the month of November; and all relieved regiments at such time as will ensure their arriving in England in the month of May. 6284 to 6294. 3836, 3837. 3938. 4701. 6245. 6295.

"Whether it be possible to consolidate the European forces so as to allow of exchange from one branch of the service to the other; and what regulations would be necessary and practicable to effect this object, with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now belonging to the Local army."

It is not possible to consolidate the European forces so as to allow of exchange from one branch of service to the other with perfect justice to the claims of all officers now belonging to the Local army. 4096, para. 3. 5360, 5361. 5366 to 5369. 6300 to 6302.

"Whether there should be any admixture of European and Native forces, either regimentally or by brigade."

There ought to be none regimentally, but the European and Native troops should be constantly combined in brigade, both in garrison and in the field, as has always been the practice.† 2404, 2405. 2406.

"Whether the Local European force should be kept up by drafts and volunteers from the Line, or should be, as at present, separately recruited for in Great Britain."

Partly by volunteers from the Line, and partly by recruiting for it separately in Great Britain. 3876 to 3880. 3936, 3937. 6079 to 6081. 6297 to 6299. 6308. 6580, 6581.

"Whether cadets sent out for service with Native troops should in the first instance be attached to European regiments to secure uniformity of drill and discipline."

No, not after their arrival in India. Cadets should not be appointed in England to the Native army, but as at present, only to the general branch of the service and to the Presidency to which they may have been nominated; their particular appointment to European or Native regiments being left to be determined by the authorities in India, according to the regulations in force at the time.‡ All cadets should be required to pass through a military college, and should be perfected in their regimental drill before going to India. Those who may be subsequently appointed to Native regiments should join them at once. 3099. 4769. 4770. 5470. 5471.

"The best means of securing the efficiency of the European local force," and "what changes it would be expedient to make in the existing system."

1. It should be of a strength sufficient to render it self-dependent, and to prevent it being regarded and treated as subordinate to the Line force; and it should be kept equally complete with respect to the number of officers present with regiments wherewith to maintain discipline. 4067, para. 2. 5304 to 5306.

2. The two forces should be placed upon a perfect equality with respect to regimental pay and allowances; and, as a rule, the various army commands, staff, and other detached appointments, shall be open to the officers of both in such proportion§ as, considering the comparative advantages and disadvantages exclusively pertaining to either from the inherent differences in the conditions to which they respectively entered the Line and Local armies and their relative proportionate numbers on the fixed establishment in India, may be deemed equitable. 6644.

The armies of the three Presidencies should continue separate.

3. The armies of Bengal, Madras, and Bombay should continue separate, and the European Local force as well as the Native force in each Presidency, should be under a separate Commander-in-chief, who should be perfectly independent of the others, and subject only to the authority of the Local Government under the supreme control of the Government of India. 1297. 2376. 3915 to 3920. 4096. 4684. 5253 to 5256. 5286 to 5293. 6241. 6589. 6673. 6678. 7014.

4. The general system of government and discipline in the European Local force should be the same as that established for the army of the Line; but the several Indian Commanders-in-chief should be left free to order any differences in minor matters of detail which climate or local circumstances may appear to them to render expedient. 4096, para. 2. 5291, 5292.

5. The armies of the three Presidencies should be equalized in numerical strength, and a corresponding portion of territory transferred to those of Madras and Bombay in the manner hereafter suggested. 1180, 1181. 1301 to 1304. 1313, 1314.

6. The establishment of officers and men for regiments and battalions of the Local army should be organized upon the basis of the plan suggested by Colonel Holland in his notes on the Indian Army. App. p. 12.

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* Minute by Sir J. Outram, 30 September 1858, App. p. 74.
† Reply of Sir J. Lawrence to Question 37. "Native Infantry, Bengal Army." App. p. 188.
‡ Minute by Sir J. Outram, 30 September 1858, App. p. 74.
§ Minute by Sir J. Outram, 30 September 1858, App. p. 74.

Promotion, pensions, staff allowances, &c.

7. The existing rules relative to promotion and retiring pensions of officers should be continued to those who may be henceforth admitted into the Local Army, but with the following modifications:—

8. No officer under the rank of regimental major should be eligible for promotion to the next superior grade unless he shall have passed the examination with regard to professional qualifications prescribed by the rules of the service, and shall have been reported by the Commander-in-chief as qualified in every other respect for the efficient performance of his duties in the superior grade. When the senior on the regimental list may be ineligible for the promotion, the next senior qualified officer should succeed to the vacancy.

1238 to 1240. 4086, para. 2.

9. It should be in the power of the several Local Governments to require any officer to take his pension and retire from the service whenever, from whatever cause, it may be considered no longer desirable to retain him on the strength of the army.

10. The military funds should be maintained, and should continue to receive the same support from the Government as at present.

11. The existing system of having different scales of staff pay to different departments, and of having staff and regimental pay composed of items under the heads of net pay, gratuity, ordinary and presidency house rent, half and full batta, tent allowance, horse allowance, &c. &c; while staff allowances are sometimes given in addition to, and sometimes in substitution of, part or the whole of the regimental allowances, should be abolished; and one scale, under two heads only, viz., garrison and field, should be established in lieu, upon the basis of the plan suggested by Colonel Holland.

App. p. 12.

4740 to 4744.

12. The present system, under which half-staff salaries are granted to officers on staff or other detached employ during their absence on sick leave, should be abolished; and the officers who actually do the duty should be entitled in all cases, those of absence on privileged leave excepted, to the full salaries of the appointments.

2038, 2039. 3197 to 3202.

13. Whether the armies of the three Presidencies be equalized in strength or not, the pecuniary advantages hitherto given to the European officers of one Presidency over that of the others in a larger proportion of full batta stations, larger salaries and allowances for office establishment* annexed to identically the same appointments, &c. &c. should be prospectively abolished, and one scale adopted for them all.

App. p. 137.

14. The existing system, under which officers at stations beyond two hundred miles distance from Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, are allowed full batta, and those at stations within that distance only half batta, should be abolished. The garrison pay should be a consolidated salary of such amount for each grade as the Government may deem sufficient, and batta should be granted alike to officers and soldiers only when in the field or marching, or when specially ordered to be held in readiness for field service. The batta for each rank should be of sufficient amount to cover all ordinary expenses attendant on movement, which the present field allowance to captains and subalterns is not.

Commands.

15. As a rule, the officers of the Line and Local armies should share in proportion to numbers in the Commands-in-chief as well as in all the divisional and brigade commands in India.

1235 to 1241. 1246 to 1249. 3079. 5466 to 5470.

16. All appointments to the commands of regiments should be made by selection, without reference to seniority, from amongst the best qualified field officers; all of whom should be made available, as Lieut.-colonels in the Local army now are, for duty with any regiment. Officers of inferior regimental rank who may have obtained that of field officer by brevet for distinguished service, should be included in the list of those eligible for such appointments. Temporary rank, as lieutenant-colonel, should be annexed to all regimental commands.

6539 to 6541.

5475. 5537. 5538. 6240. 6529. 6537. 6567. 6240. 6568. 6539 to 6541.

17. All appointments to the command of brigades and divisions should be made in like manner, by selection from amongst the most active and best qualified colonels and lieutenant-colonels, without reference to seniority; the interests of the public service alone being considered in making these appointments. The temporary rank of brigadier general should be annexed to all brigade, and that of major-general to all divisional commands.

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* Minutes of Sir P. Grant, "General staff of the Madras army," 18 November 1856, App. p. 137.

18. As a rule, no officer should be appointed to a brigade, divisional, or chief command in India, who has not, in addition to general fitness, the particular qualification of having had some years actual local experience by previous service in that country; and rules should be adopted for effectually guarding against the appointment to those commands of officers, however highly distinguished, who either by age, impaired health, or other causes, may be in any degree incapacitated for that active personal supervision of the troops under their command which the interests of the public service require.

4067, para. 4. 4096, para. 2. 4166 to 4168. 6529. 6531 to 6533.

Hitherto, in India, the rule of succession or appointment to regimental, brigade, and divisional commands has been that of seniority, and under it,* upon the occurrence of a vacancy, the senior officer on the list, unless especially reported unfit, succeeded or was appointed to it as a matter of course. The principle adopted by the Home authorities in establishing this rule being that "length of service"† should be held to give officers a "claim" to those commands which should "never be set aside except on public grounds." The consequence has been, that practically, mere negative merit, when backed by seniority,‡ has been considered to establish the validity of the "claim," and that these commands, instead of being invariably filled as the interests of the public service required that they should be, by officers fully qualified for positions of such high trust and responsibility, have been frequently held by officers who, from various causes, were to a great degree incapacitated for the efficient performance of the duties.§

6529, 6530. 7006, 7007.

The evil effects resulting from this system, were brought to the attention of the government of India many years ago by the Commander-in-chief at Bombay, and again in 1852 and 1853 by the Commander-in-chief in India,‖ and the substitution of the rule of "selection for efficiency" was strongly recommended in view to ensure the appointment of the best qualified officers to these commands for the future. But, although practically adopted on some occasions by Lords Ellenborough and Dalhousie, and since the late mutiny, by the present Government of India, and although the Home authorities¶ sent out instructions in May last enjoining the Indian Government not to permit any but "good" and "experienced" officers to command "Native regiments," it would seem that "seniority" still forms the rule, and "selection for efficiency" the exception.

5536.* 1237. 1253. 4641, 4642. 4932, 4933. 6242, 6243. 6532, 6533. 6534.

The unsoundness of the principle upon which the existing rule is established, I think can be clearly shown. The arguments which have been adduced in its favour are that "the organization of all great armies depends in a great measure upon attention being "paid to officers of a certain rank," "that you utterly cut away the whole object of the "organism of armies if you entirely put aside attention to the just claims of officers," and that the seniority system affords a "great security against favouritism or jobbery."

4641. 6532. 6536.

As regards the first of these arguments, it may be sufficient to remark that it is to officers of a certain rank and qualification, and not "of a certain rank" only, that the "attention" contended for is required to be accorded in reference to commands in the organization of an army; that under the rules of selection for efficiency they would be conferred upon officers of the same grade as under the rule of seniority, and that while the Government can confer the requisite rank upon any officer, it cannot endow him with the requisite qualifications.

5340. 5466 to 5474. 5538. 6996, 6997. 6996, 6997. 7002. 7004

With respect to the second argument, surely it is opposed to the principles of sound reasoning that mere "length of service" should give an officer any "claim" whatever to be appointed to commands which, to be exercised with advantage to the public service, unquestionably require in the officers holding them a much more than ordinary amount of natural and professional ability. To command a regiment of a thousand soldiers in such a manner as to keep it at all times in that high state of discipline and efficiency which is necessary to fit it for service in the field, is not so easy a task as the advocates of the seniority system appear to consider it, while the qualifications requisite for the command of a brigade and division are of a still higher order, and include that of perfect competency to command troops of all arms, to exercise them in brigade, and to train and practise them in every description of field duty. The public interests therefore require that these important appointments should be entirely reserved for the best and ablest of

6240. 6534, 6535. 6537. 6681.

* Major-General Tucker's evidence, App. p. 11.
† Letter from Court of Directors to the Governor-General of India in Council, dated 23 June 1835.
‡ Sir P. Grant in continuation of his memorandum, dated 29 June 1857, App p. 140.
§ "The Indian revolt," by Major General Tucker, 3rd Edition, pages 18, 19, and 23.
‖ Major-General Tucker's evidence, App. p. 11.
¶ Letter from Court of Directors to Governor-General of India in Council, dated 18 May 1858.

the field officers; and the efficiency of the Army clearly ought not to be sacrificed, in the smallest degree, to serve the interests of individual officers, whatever their length of service.

In regard to the third argument, I would observe that the "security against favouritism and jobbery," afforded by the rule of seniority is, for the reasons above stated, the very worst kind of security that a Government could adopt. Admitting that the substitution of the rule for selection for efficiency might lead to favouritism and jobbery in the appointments to these commands, this evil at the worst would be only occasioned, while the good gained would be general and constant; for it is not in reason to suppose that any commander-in-chief or governor-general would systematically act under the influence of unworthy motives in making appointments upon which his own credit, as well as the preservation of the discipline and efficiency of the Army so greatly depend; and surely it is not the part of wisdom to provide against a possible occasional abuse of trust, by continuing a system essentially unsound, which has worked so ill and which the Government of India, since the outbreak of the mutiny, has found it necessarily practically to set aside.

6242. 6531. 6693. Of infinitely greater importance is it to the public interests that none but officers of the highest professional ability and of entire fitness in every other respect, should ever be appointed to either of the Indian commands in chief. It is obviously essential that they should be men of a stamp to be looked up to by all ranks of the armies placed under their respective command, and fully competent not only to maintain their efficiency in every branch, but to give sound counsel to the Government upon every point connected with the military department of their respective Presidencies. It has been the case however, not unfrequently, that officers have been appointed to these commands who were to a great degree incapacitated by age, impaired health, or other causes, for efficiently performing the duties, and were unable to exercise that active personal supervision of the troops, which the interests of the public service required. I twice attempted 6243. 6533. to put questions to witnesses before the Commission with the view of placing the general fact above stated, in an authenticated form, upon the minutes of evidence; but, although my questions were acknowledged by the chairman to come fairly within the scope of the inquiry, and to be framed in an unobjectionable language, the Commission decided that they should not be put. I have considered it my duty therefore myself to state the fact, both in justice to the Indian Army, and in order to show the necessity which exists for effectually guarding against such appointments being made in future.

Patronage. 5265. 5276. 6197. 6207. 6229 to 6234. 6525. 6528. 19. Of whatever troops the European force in India may be composed, the Army patronage, as regards all Indian appointments, those to the commands in chief alone excepted, should be vested in the hands of the Indian authorities.

20. All Army patronage should be authoritatively declared to be given by Her 1399. 3120. 3121. 6998, 6999. Majesty to those vested with it, as a trust to be administered bonâ fide, in such manner as shall best promote the interests of the public service; and it should be declared to be an abuse of trust for any public officer under the Crown to take advantage of his official position, and attempt to influence the authorities in India who may be invested with such patronage by soliciting staff or other appointments for any person whatever.

6224, 6225, 4067–4. 4170, 4171. 5330. 5332. 6525. 6196, 6207. 6197. 6229 to 6238. It is only fair that the officers who are serving in India should enjoy the full benefit of all the Army appointments in that country;* it is also clearly for the interests of the public service that those appointments should be held by officers who have had some years of Indian experience, and that the selection should be left in all cases to the local authorities.

Although there is perhaps no service in which patronage is generally administered with a greater regard to the public interests than in the Indian army, official influence as well as private interest are nevertheless brought to bear not unfrequently even there to obtain undue favour towards individual officers. The former, I think, might be put an entire stop to, and the latter in a great measure prevented by an authoritative declaration to the effect above suggested, and by ruling that the person who nominates an officer to any appointment shall in every case state in his letter or minute submitting the name for the approval of the Government, that he believes the officer selected to be in every respect qualified to perform the duties with advantage to the public service. When nominated by the Commander-in-chief, or any officer of inferior rank, the name of the person upon whose recommendation the appointment is made should be mentioned in the Government

* Minute by Sir J. Outram, 30 September 1858, App. p. 74.

general order. A further salutary check against the abuse of patronage would be found in ruling that no officer should be actually withdrawn from his regiment without first passing an examination as to his acquirements and aptitude for the particular appointment for which he may be selected; and in extending the existing system of publishing in the Army lists official notices of the war services of officers as well as of the examinations which they may have passed in the native languages, or in particular branches of professional knowledge, in order that their respective claims and qualifications may be more fully made known to the authorities and to the military community.

21. Rules should be established to ensure the entire fitness of all officers employed on the staff of the Army for the particular appointments for which they may be selected.

22. Temporary army rank, and of higher grades than at present given, should be substituted for the official rank annexed under existing regulations, to certain appointments on the general staff of the Army in India when filled by officers of inferior rank, to be confirmed on the officers vacating them after a certain term of years, if specially recommended for such promotion by the local Commander-in-chief or Government.*

23. The power to decide upon the claims of officers of the local Army to be recommended to the Crown for honours in reward for distinguished service, should be vested in the Government of India alone.

4096, para. 3. 4707. 5265, 5266. 6546 to 6548.

24. The Armies of India, European and Native, should be entirely subordinate to the Government of India; and, except with regard to the promotion of officers, which should be entirely left to the Horse Guards, the troops of the line while serving in India should be wholly subject to the authority of the several local Governments, under the supreme control of the Government of India.

5265 to 5268. 5276. 5284. 5296 to 5303. 5312 to 5317. 5497. 6178. 6183. 6548. 6550. 6554. 6557.

25. The relative social position of the officers of the Army with the members of the Civil Service should be raised by introducing a more just order of precedence, especially as regards officers in the higher grades.

26. The uniform of European regiments in India should be modified to suit the climate. The clothing should be of a lighter texture than that for troops in England, and should be fitted loosely, so as to allow the soldier perfectly free use of all his limbs. All such articles as hussar pelisses, Highland bonnets and kilts, metal helmets and scabbards, schakos, valises, sabretaches, pipeclayed belts, stiff leather stocks, &c. should be at once and for ever abolished in India, and a lighter description of uniform should be devised for regiments while serving in that country, better calculated to promote the health and comfort as well as the general efficiency of the troops. When in the field, the soldier should carry nothing on his back but his cloak folded in his knapsack slings, and a havresack and water canteen slung over his shoulder; his knapsack together with all his other necessaries being carried on the baggage animals, except only on occasions of special service on which it may be necessary that he should carry his pack also on his person.

Dress and Accoutrements.

6584. 2414. 2421. 4130. 4134. 4137. 4140. 4142. 4444 to 4449. 5967. 5976.

27. The European cavalry should be all light cavalry, and should be made really such by being composed of men of light weight, and by neither man nor horse being loaded with any article which is not essentially necessary for efficiency in the field. The arms of a trooper should be a sword and a double-barrelled rifle carbine; and his dress, accoutrements, and horse furniture should be so regulated that, when fully equipped for field service, his weight on his horse should not exceed 14 stone, which is about that of a native trooper of the Scinde horse.

1605.

28. Serjeants-major of European regiments should have increased advantages with respect to rank. Staff allowances and pension after completing certain periods of service n that appointment; and the scale should be so fixed as to make the appointment, in in regard to those advantages, at the least equal in value to appointments in the several Army departments.

6648.

29. The measures which of late years have been in progress in India to improve the dwellings of married soldiers, and to elevate the position of their wives, should be strenuously persisted in.

30. Every care should be taken to withdraw European troops from those stations in the plains which experience has shown to be unhealthy, and to make the greatest possible use of elevated table-lands for their location.

Selection of military stations. 4383–II para. 3. 4401. 6051 to 6058.

* Notes on the Indian Army, by Colonel Holland, App. p. 12.

2281. 2290. 31. The system hitherto adopted of maintaining numerous small stations, garrisoned with a single regiment, or small mixed detachments,* should be as far as practicable abandoned; and the troops in each Presidency should be cantoned in large masses, 2415. 2417. composed of troops of all arms, European and Native, at a few well-selected stations, with good roads of communication and ready means of access to the trunk lines of road and railway, and in the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, to the principal ports of the sea coast.

33. Camps for exercise and field-training should be annually formed in each division of the Army during the cold season, and the troops of all arms marched through the country and practised in every description of field duty.

"The proportion which European should bear to Native troops in infantry, cavalry, and artillery respectively."

The proportion of European to Native Force, to be maintained in the permanent establishment of each Presidency, should be sufficient to form at all times a just equipose. It may not be necessary to keep up the maximum proportion of native troops, which may bear a varying proportion, as circumstances may render expedient, within certain limits; the following would, in my opinion, form the best general rule that can be adopted:—

Horse Artillery - - -	All Europeans.
Foot Artillery - - -	Five Europeans to not more than two Natives (fighting men).
Sappers and Miners - -	All Natives, but with a large proportion of European non-commissioned officers.
Cavalry and Infantry - -	One European to not more than four Natives.

The above refers only to troops borne on the returns of the Army of each Presidency, excluding Police. Until the country is restored to tranquillity, the proportion of European to Native Force will require to be much greater in the Bengal Presidency than in the others, and would be best regulated by means of temporarily retaining such additional troops, belonging to the Army of the Line, as may be deemed requisite, and fixing the establishment of Native regiments at a lower strength than in the other Presidencies.

"The permanent force necessary to be maintained in the Indian provinces respectively, after the restoration of tranquillity."

The amount of permanent European Force, and its distribution to the several Presidencies, should be determined principally by the consideration of what will be sufficient, together with an auxiliary Native Force, to maintain a secure hold of the entire country, and to furnish, besides, a due proportion for field service beyond India, when required for its defence against aggression. The maintenance of a just equipoise to the Native Force should also be made a consideration; but the best security against the recurrence of such a mutiny as we have recently had in the Bengal Native Army, will be found, I am confident, not so much in a preponderating European Force, as in the adoption of a better system of organization and discipline, and in the re-establishment of mutual confidence between the Native soldier and his European officer, and between the Native Army and the Government.

1141. 1144. 1567. 1570. 2359. 2375.

European force.

From the evidence given before Commissioners, and that contained in the various papers from India, the opinion evidently predominates that India can be held securely in future only by an army mainly composed of European soldiers; and that, although it will be necessary still to maintain a certain amount of Native Force, little or no dependence can, or ought to be, placed upon it by the Government. † The permanent European force which the majority of those who have been consulted estimate as requisite, may be stated at from 80,000 to 100,000 men. ‡ I concur in opinion, however, with those who, with more confidence in the trustworthiness of Native troops, consider that a much smaller Europeon force would be sufficient; and I transcribe the following extracts from letters from one of the most distinguished soldiers and administrators of the Indian Army, the late lamented General John Jacob, as expressing, far more forcibly than any language of mine could do, the views which I entertain upon this subject:—

1150, 1151. 1179. 1571. 2285, 2286. 2291. 2357. 3056. 4100. 4754. 5723.

"It seems to me§ to be absolutely certain that we cannot hold India by an army "chiefly, or in large proportions, composed of English soldiers, and that to attempt to "do so must be attended with speedy and utter ruin.

"In the first place, England could not supply the numbers of soldiers supposed, on "the most moderate estimate, to be required for the purpose of maintaining such an "army in the East.

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* Précis of replies to 1st series of questions, para. 11. App. p. 167.
† Précis of replies from India to questions relative to the proportion of European to Native troops, App. p. 169.
‡ Memorandum by Viscount Canning, para. 15, App. p. 58.
§ Letter to Colonel Durant, dated 7 June 1858, paras. 5 to 13.

"And, again, it is clear to me that, if we could command even such a host of "Europeans as the grand army with which Napoleon invaded Russia, the attempt to "coerce India with such forces would only end in more complete and hopeless failure.

"The mere brute force of hundreds of thousands of men becomes powerless before "that of hundreds of millions of such people as the nations of India. The whole force "of the Mogul Empire was never able to subdue even one of these nations, the "Rajpoots.

"To attempt to govern India by the force of numbers of English soldiers must, it seems "to me, alienate from us all of the best of the inhabitants of the country, who are now "assuredly inclined to favour and to support our power; while those inclined to be dis-"satisfied with our rule, who have hitherto been effectually restrained by the knowledge "that the feelings of the great body of the people were with us, would then be free to "display their hostility.

"Whatever the number of European soldiers employed, if we found ourselves placed "in opposition to the whole people of India, composing all the classes above referred to, "the result could not long be doubtful.

"We should, I conceive, speedily find ourselves in the position of a waggoner, who, "finding his horses unruly and troublesome, and perhaps getting a kick from one of the "animals, should dispense with the services of the team, and place himself with one or "two of his friends between the shafts. It is certain that, though the men might break "their hearts with their exertions, they would not move the load one inch; but let the "driver, instead of finding fault with the poor horses, improve his own guiding power a "little,—let him handle his team more skilfully, and he would soon find all working "together with irresistible power, quietly, steadily, and well.

"Thus, I am convinced that this great empire also cannot be controlled by English "bone and muscle, by numbers of English bodies; but it can be held in perfect safety "and security by English minds, by English moral power, by the influence of a "moderate number of cultivated English gentlemen, rather than by a multitude of "rude soldiers."

"We could hardly obtain recruits for the Crimea:* how can we expect, under the "present system, to obtain them for this country in greater numbers? Without the "assistance of large numbers of Native Indian troops, an army of Europeans could not "move or subsist in the field. The enemy would only have to keep a little out of the "way at first, to leave the Englishmen to follow their own strange devices, and they "would all die,—aided by knapsacks, cross-belts, and pipeclay, the sun and the climate "would do the business most effectually. Indeed the helplessness and ignorance of the "officers and men of Royal troops in this country at first is often ludicrous, while it should "be remembered that they would then, under the proposed arrangements, have no "associations with the regular native army to aid their inexperience, and that the wants "and habits of the Englishman are entirely different from those of the people of the "country, so that no amount of force would enable them to help themselves to what "they required.

"Again, seasons frequently occur (I have known many such) when every man is "disabled by fever. At such times our military force would be annihilated, we having "no regular Native Indian army, and having wilfully placed the people in the position of "conquered enemies, restrained by physical force only, instead of their being, as now, "generally our fast friends."

As the amount of European force required in one Presidency will depend in some measure upon that which may be maintained in the others, and as the expediency or otherwise of dividing the Bengal Army into two, which would probably involve an alteration of the present territorial limits of the Madras and Bombay Presidencies, forms one of the heads of inquiry adopted by the Commissioners in reference to the Native Army, I shall extend my estimate to the force required for the whole of India.

If the permanent Native force to be henceforth maintained be confined (as it oughtto be) to the legitimate purpose of an Army, namely, that of assisting to maintain the general peace of the country, and of furnishing a due proportion of troops for field service

* Letter to Sir C. Trevelyan, dated 24th March 1858, paras 9 and 10.

beyond India, when occasion may require; if also the population be disarmed, and an efficient police force be organized throughout the country, (measures which I understand
2287 to 2289. to be already in course of being carried out,) a much smaller Native force will suffice than
3056. 6739. 6750. has hitherto been maintained. Whatever amount may be determined on, it should be armed with the best description of weapons, have the highest military training, and be
2301. made, in every other respect, as efficient as possible for fighting purposes. It should also have as high a status in relation to the European force as can possibly be given to it,
2357. and should receive (as I am satisfied it will deserve to receive, if properly organized and disciplined) the full confidence of the Government.

The greater part those who have given evidence on the subject, both in England and
* 1133 to 1135. India (there are some eminent exceptions*) have expressed, indeed, very strong opinions
* 1142, 1143. in opposition to this view, and under the influence of their own distrust of the future
* 1448. 2267. fidelity of any native soldier, consequent on the late mutiny, have advocated the adoption
* 2273 to 2276. of a system, the effect of which would be to place the entire Native Army upon the
* 3074. footing of a mere armed police force. They would exclude natives altogether from the Artillery and Engineer corps; would give the native soldiers of the Cavalry and
2496 to 2502. Infantry an inferior description of arms and ammunition, with as little scientific instruction
5501 to 5503. and field training as possible; and would keep them in every other respect, as regards
7026 to 7032. efficiency for fighting purposes, considerably below the standard for European troops, with the view of rendering them less dangerous in the event of another mutiny. But it
172, 173. 829. 835. is obvious that the adoption of this course would render the Native Army impotent also
1148. 7033. against the troops of an enemy in the field, would so brand it with the distrust of the Government as to render all confidence and attachment on the part of the native officers
4195 to 4202. and soldiers impossible for the future, and would so lower it in the estimation of the European Army, and of the country, that no British officer could serve with it without a
1375 to 3188. feeling of degredation. Nor does the late mutiny justify the conclusion, that no Native
518. 520. Army can again be trusted by the Government; for the more that the pre-existing state of
2362 to 2367. 2788 to 2794. the Bengal Native Army has been exposed to view during the present inquiry, the more
2796. apparent has it become that its whole system of organization and government was the
2814, 2815. worst possible;† that it was consequently, and had been for many years previously, totally
3562, 3563. devoid of discipline; and that, as stated by General Jacob, in his remarks on the Bengal
3590 to 3594. Army, published in the year 1851, its normal state was, in fact, a state of mutiny. Further, that the records of the Indian Army abound with instances (of which that faithful band of Bengal sepoys at Lucknow has furnished, perhaps the most remarkable) of devoted attachment to their European officers, and of fidelity to the Government on the part of the native soldiers under the most trying circumstances; and the fidelity of the Madras and Bombay Armies generally (although there is much in their systems
1144. 1351. calling for amendment,) during that most critical period, between the first outbreak of the
1353. 1356. 1562. 567. mutiny and the arrival of European reinforcements, affords strong additional ground for
357. 2359. 2393. believing that by the adoption of a better system of organization and discipline, an efficient and trustworthy Native Army may be maintained sufficient for all requirements.

" It is certain that the natives of India,‡ even of Hindoostan proper, habitually under " proper treatment and commanded as *men*, in accordance with living principles and " natural laws, can be made as good, true, and faithful soldiers as any European " whatever.

" This has been long known to me, but its truth has been placed beyond a doubt " by the facts which have occurred while I was absent in Persia during the last year, in " Upper Scinde, where a body of native officers and Hindoostanee sepoys, mostly from " the most disturbed districts around Delhi, standing alone amidst the rebellious " inhabitants of the country and the disaffected sepoys of other corps in the Govern- " ment service, when tried and tempted as none of their brethren have been tried or " tempted elsewhere, not only remained themselves perfectly faithful and true, but, " without an European soldier within hundreds of miles of them, controlled and " repressed every attempt, however insidious or however formidable, by whomsoever " made, whether by secret persuasion or open force, at mutiny and rebellion around " them, and thus saved the lives of all the Europeans in this province, and prevented a " violent open rebellion throughout Scinde and Beloochistan, while in some instances " they knew that their sons and relations, though probably as true men as themselves, " were being executed as traitors by British officers in Hindoostan."

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* Memorandum by Sir Patrick Grant, dated June 29, 1857, App. p. 129.
† Letter from Brigadier General Jacob to Colonel Durand, dated June 7, 1858, paras. 13 and 14.

"It is quite clear to me* that, with properly selected officers and with a proper "organization, our native Indian Army may be made as powerful, as true, as completely "trustworthy as any Europeans on earth. Nothing has failed us now except our own "foolish work. We have persisted for a long series of years in opposing every law of "nature in our treatment of our Asiastic soldiers, and having systematically destroyed "the health and living force throughout our Army, we need not be surprised that it has "fallen to pieces. Had we striven to cultivate and to develope living power instead of "crushing it under blind regulation, all would have been sound, healthy, and strong; "all would soon become so now if true principles were adopted."

Disarmament of the population.

As regards the general disarmament of the native population, I do not expect that the measure can be at once completely carried out. On the contrary, I am aware that it must be a work of time, requiring patience and discretion, with a careful consideration of local circumstances; but with these provisoes, it undoubtedly may and should be adopted as a fixed unvarying policy throughout India.

2558, 2559. 7017 to 7020.

Police force.

The system upon which the Police force is to be organized in future is also a matter to be considered in estimating the native military force to be maintained. At present there is a large number of police corps, with an entirely military organization,† armed and trained as soldiers, and some of them, fully equal in efficiency for war purposes to army regiments; while, from their not being amenable to military discipline, nor bound to the Government by the same strong ties of self-interest, they are of course far less trustworthy. Several eminent civilians and officers among those who have been consulted, have urged the advisability of abandoning the system, and of establishing in lieu, throughout India, a civil police force, of which only a small proportion in each district should have a quasi-military organization, for the purpose of furnishing guards over gaols and treasuries, and taking other similar civil duties hitherto performed by the Native Army. The Madras Government‡ is understood to have recently adopted this system, which appears to me the best that can be devised, and if found so upon trial, it may be presumed will be also adopted, as far as practicable, in the other Presidencies. Should it be determined, however, still to maintain any police corps with a military organization, they certainly ought not to be allowed to wear a uniform resembling that of the Army, nor to have a better description of arms nor a higher military training than will suffice to render them efficient for their own proper duties.

2287, 2218. 3058. 6739. 6750.

3060, 3061. 6667. 6752. 6756, 6757. 796. 6806 to 1810. 7021 to 7024.

European and native force. 6311. 6665. 6672.

Assuming the general correctness of the views above advocated, I am of opinion that the permanent force necessary to be maintained in India, *after the restoration of tranquillity*, will be as follows:—

Strength before the Mutiny as given in the India House Returns.				Proposed Strength.			Remarks.
	Non-commissioned and Rank and File.			Non-commissioned and Rank and File.			
	European.	Native.	Total.	European.	Native.	Total.	
Artillery - - -	6,419	9,138	15,557	12,000	(a)6,000	18,000	(a) Including about 3,000 gun lascars and drivers of native batteries.
Sappers - - - -	110	3,043	3,153	500	3,500	4.000	
Cavalry - - -	2,456	30,533	32,989	7,000	20,000	27,000	
Infantry - - - -	29,760	188,660	218,420	40,000	120,000	160,000	
Total - -	38,745	231,374	270,119	59,500	149,500	209,000	

2294 to 2299.

The artillery has been calculated at the estimate of four guns to 1,000 cavalry and infantry; not too large a proportion, when it is understood to comprise all reserves, and to be attached to an army greatly reduced in numbers in consideration of its improved organization, in which the increase of European artillery forms of itself an integral portion. The number above given would allow of 120 batteries of six guns, and 150 men each, including gun lascars. Of these it is calculated that about 20 batteries would usually be in the arsenals, and their men would form a reserve.

* Brigadier General Jacob's replies to questions relative to the recruiting and composition of infantry corps, Jan. 27, 1858.
† Memorandum by Viscount Canning, paras. 13 and 14, App. p. 58.
‡ Proposed organization of a police for the Madras Presidency.

The drivers of the European horse batteries should be furnished, as in the horse artillery, from among the gunners. As the gun lascars (about 20 to each battery) and the drivers of the native batteries are included in the 6,000 men shown in the table, the number of actual Native artillery, it will be observed, will be reduced to a minimum.

I have added a large number of Europeans and a small number of Natives to the proposed strength of the sappers and miners, which should be strong enough to furnish a complete company for each division of the Army, leaving a body at regimental head-quarters sufficient for the periodical relief of detached companies, so that the whole may go through a course of field training, at least once in three years.

"Whether it would be possible to raise any regiments in the Colonies, either for temporary or permanent service in India."

It might be possible, but would not be expedient.* 1346. 2357.

"Whether the Native forces should be regular or irregular, or both, and if so, in what proportion."

Cavalry.

The cavalry† should be all upon the irregular system, with the following modifications:—

A russuldar-major and a kote duffadar-major (corresponding with a sabadar-major and havildar-major of the line) should be added to the establishment.

The pay should be fixed at such rate as will enable the men to provide themselves with the best description of arms, and with as good horses as Government has hitherto furnished to the regular regiments.

1291. 1605. 1631. 1636.

The periods of service entitling to pension should be made the same as for regular regiments.

The designation "Native Light Cavalry," should be substituted for that of "Irregular Cavalry."

1634. 2302.

I recommend the exclusive adoption of the irregular system, because, with the modifications above suggested, the native cavalry would, I think, under it, be the best that can be formed for the service required from this arm in Indian warfare. The irregular system, too, accords best with the customs and feelings of the natives, and, rendering the service more popular, would, it may be hoped, in course of time, so extend the recruiting ground for the cavalry branch as to obviate the necessity which appears hitherto to have existed in all the Presidencies, for allowing the regular cavalry regiments to be composed principally of men of one caste and nationality.

Infantry.

The Infantry, with the exception of such few local corps, as under peculiar circumstances may occasionally be found necessary, should be on the regular system, under which this arm may be made perfectly efficient for every description of service; but, in order to render it more popular, it would be expedient to alter the dress of the Native ranks to a style more in accordance with native taste and usage.

2354. 2412 to 2415.

European non-commissioned officers.

There should be no European non-commissioned officers in the establishment of Native regiments. The plan of discontinuing the grade‡ of Native commissioned officers, and substituting a European serjeant and corporal to each company, which has been advocated by some of the officers who have been consulted in England and India, would be, on every account, most unadvisable.

Native commissioned officers.

1283. 1722. 2358 to 2360. 2372 to 2374. 3092 to 3096. 4210. 243. 1054. 1055. 1057. 1507 to 1509. 3089 to 3091. 5501 to 5503.

The present establishment of Native commissioned officers should be maintained in all regiments, and it would be highly expedient to raise their position and emoluments, and to enlarge the sphere of their duties, by opening to them the commands of troops and companies, the effect of which would be to strengthen their authority and influence, and to afford a great additional security for their fidelity to the Government. The inefficiency and untrustworthiness of this class of officers in the Bengal Army is clearly attributable to the vicious system under which, in that Presidency, only the superannuated can obtain promotion to the commissioned grade, and the senior havildar on the list, if of respectable character, instead of the most deserving and best qualified, is held entitled to this promotion. Under the system of selection for merit and superior qualifications which obtains in the Bombay Army, the native commissioned officers generally are efficient, and during the late troublous times have been found trustworthy. It was by two native officers, one a Brahmin, and the other of the Mahratta caste, that the intended rising in mutiny of the 21st regiment of Native Infantry, composed principally of men enlisted from the upper provinces of Bengal, was revealed to the commanding officer in time for the necessary measures to be taken for disarming the corps, which was thus effected without bloodshed.

1720. 2812. 3673, 3674. 6244.

* General Jacob's evidence before quoted. Memorandum by Viscount Canning, para. 39. Punjaub Committee's reply to question 14, 1st series, App. p. 178.

† Major Merewether's memorandum on the construction of the Scinde Horse, note 1, App. p. 11.

‡ Reply of Punjaub Committee to question 8, section iii., App. p. 195.

The admission of native gentlemen into the commissioned ranks of the Army, without passing through the inferior grades, would be an inexpedient measure. It would necessarily diminish greatly the principal stimulus which the existing system (at least in Bombay) affords to zeal and fidelity on the part of the non-commissioned ranks; and would, I think, give us a less efficient and less trustworthy class of native officers than can be obtained by the promotion of men selected for known qualifications and of tried fidelity, after a service of from ten to twenty years.

Admission of Native gentlemen into the commissioned grade.
2388 to 2390.
3082 to 3086.

With respect to European commissioned officers, the commanding officer of every regiment, regular and irregular, should be appointed by selection for superior qualifications alone.* The adoption of this rule is essential to the maintenance of that high state of efficiency and discipline, in which it is necessary that every regiment should be maintained, and will be practicable under whatever system the establishment of European officers for the Indian Army may be prospectively organized.

Commanding officers.
1235 to 1241.
3079.

As regards the number of officers required with each regiment. It has been fully shown by the results of the system that has obtained in irregular regiments, and especially in the instances of the Punjaub Guide corps, and Scinde horse, which for many years past have been so distinguished for their high state of efficiency and discipline, that a very small number of well qualified officers is sufficient to meet all requirements;† and there is no reason why the same should not suffice for regular regiments, provided they too be placed under the command of officers selected on account of their superior qualifications and invested with ample powers. The total number should be fixed at five for each regiment, but in determining the future establishment of European officers for the Army of each Presidency, it will be necessary to make provision for supplying duly qualified officers to fill vacancies occurring among this limited number with native corps, as well as for the numerous staff and other detached appointments, civil and military, for which the Army is required to furnish officers.

European commissioned officers.
1261. 1265.
1268 to 1270.
1235 to 1238.
3079 to 3081.
3099, 3100.

"The real error is in employing numbers of costly Europeans in command of native "companies, whose duties would be just as well, or better performed by native officers "properly chosen, and formed in a good school.‡

"The great numbers of European officers now allowed prevents the Native officer, "whatever his merit, from attaining a responsible or very respectable position in the "Army; thereby keeping out of its ranks, natives of birth, wealth, and family, and "presenting in the native soldier the full development of that love for and pride in the "service, which are essential to great efficiency."

"Qualifications, not numbers, are necessary for the leaders of native Indian soldiers. "One active, energetic, right-feeling, and right-thinking English gentleman can, even "when alone, infuse an excellent spirit into thousands of these eastern soldiers, till they "will follow him anywhere, obey him in all things, and feel the greatest pride in acting "in his absence, as they know he would wish them to do if present.

"The feelings thus engendered are most powerful and most honourable.

"The native officers and men feel the greatest gratitude towards him who has raised "their moral, intellectual, and worldly position, and are actuated by the strongest wish, "and energetic zeal to show that they are worthy of the respectable position in which "they find themselves.

The plan of an unattached list, unless the system of selection be substituted for that of seniority, would be attended with the disadvantages of placing the whole of the officers of each branch of the service upon a dead level with respect to promotion, and, consequently, of considerably augmenting the evil,§ already so great, of the higher grades, being principally filled by superannuated officers. A plan by which the chief advantages of the unattached and regimental systems would be secured, and the disadvantages of the former would be in a great measure obviated, was proposed by Colonel Holland, and submitted by me to the Commander-in-chief of the Bombay Army many years ago, and having been referred to in his evidence, is annexed in the Appendix. At my request, that officer has furnished me with an abstract of his revised scheme, showing more fully the financial advantages it possesses; and as I am of opinion that it is the best which has been devised, to meet the changes in the organization of the native army which I advocate, I here subjoin it.

Organization of European officers.
3099, 3100.

App. p. 12.

* Sir P. Grant, in continuation of his memorandum, dated June 29, 1857, App. p. 125.
† Sir P. Grant, in continuation of his memorandum, dated June 29, 1857, App. p. 125.
‡ Brigadier General Jacob's reply to question 9, 3d series, Infantry corps.
§ Minutes of Evidence, Army Purchase Commission, 1857, question 704, pp. 35 and 36.

I.—RETURN showing the Number of Troops, Regular and Irregular, on the Indian Establishment before the Mutiny, and as proposed by Colonel Holland (Veterans not included).

Description.	Line Troops.		Local Troops.										Grand Total.
				Artillery.			Cavalry.			Infantry.			
Establishment in 1857.	Cavalry: 4 Regiments.	Infantry: 22 Regiments.	Engineers and Sappers: 11 Battalions of Officers.	Horse Artillery: 17 European Troops, 5 Native ditto.	European Foot: 12 Battalions.	Native Foot: 6 Battalions.	European.	Native Regular: 21 Regiments.	Native Irregular: 33 Regiments.	European: 9 Regiments.	Native Regular: 155 Regiments.	Native Irregular: 45 Regiments.	
Officers (Colonels inclusive)	132	814	275	125	325	150	- -	483	- -	456	4,030	- -	6,790
European Non-commissioned Rank and File	2,804	23,716	110	2,040	4,800	36	- -	63	- -	8,523	310	- -	42,402
Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned Rank and File	- -	- -	3,000	660	- -	3,600	- -	9,532	20,955	- -	145,700	35,215	218,662
Gun Lascars	- -	- -	- -	459	1,680	360	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	2,499
Artillery Drivers	- -	- -	- -	- -	1,488	864	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	2,352
Total in 1857	2,936	24,530	3,385	3,284	8,293	5,010	- -	10,078	20,955	8,979	150,040	35,215	272,705
Proposed Establishment.	None.	22 Regiments.	11 Battalions.	5 Brigades, 20 European Troops.	22 Battalions, European Foot.	3 Battalions, Native Foot.	10 Regiments.	None.	24 Regiments.	16 Regiments.	150 Battalions, 50 Regiments.	None.	—
European Officers (Colonels inclusive)	- -	814	275	140	616	84	370	- -	- -	784	2,250	- -	5,333
European Non-commissioned Rank and File	- -	23,716	500	2,880	10,760	18	7,000	- -	- -	16,784	300	- -	61,958
Native Commissioned, Non-commissioned Rank and File	- -	- -	3,000	- -	- -	1,800	- -	- -	20,400	- -	141,000	- -	166,200
Gun Lascars	- -	- -	- -	500	2,640	180	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	3,320
Artillery Drivers	- -	- -	- -	- -	-	432	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	- -	432
Proposed Total	- -	24,530	3,775	3,520	14,016	2,514	7,370	- -	20,400	17,668	143,550	- -	237,243

The actual *Strength* in 1857 amounted to the following Numbers, the difference showing the Numbers absent in Europe or wanting to complete:—

European Officers	6,170
„ Soldiers	38,502
Native ditto	222,739
Gun Lascars	2,450
Drivers	2,337

II.—STRENGTH of the Local Regular Army, in Regiments of European Cavalry and Infantry, and in Brigades and Battalions of Artillery, in Battalions of Engineers and Regiments of Native Cavalry and Infantry, in 1857, and as now proposed.

Arm.	In 1857.			Proposed.			Increase.			Decrease.			Maximum Number of Officers for Staff employ		Remarks.
	Regiments, &c.	Officers.		Regiments, &c.	Officers.		Regiments, &c.	Officers.		Regiments, &c.	Officers.		Per Regiment, &c.	Total.	
		Field.	Captains and Subalterns.		Field.	Captains and Subalterns.		Field.	Captains and Subalterns.		Field.	Captains and Subalterns.			
Artillery	24	3	22	30	4	24	6	48	192	—	—	—	6	180	Colonels included among the officers.
Engineers	11	3	22	11	3	22	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	
European Cavalry	—	—	—	10	5	32	10	50	320	—	—	—	6	60	The proportion of field to subordinate officers is here given more favourably than at present; but it is, even as proposed, much below that of the English artillery and engineers, where it is as 1 to 4.
Ditto Infantry	9	5	46	16	7	42	7	67	258	—	—	—	12	192	
Native Cavalry	21	3	20	—	—	—	—	—	—	21	63	420	—	—	
Ditto Infantry	155	3	23	50	8	37	—	—	—	5	65	1,715	13	650	
	—	—	—	—	—	—	23	165	770	26	128	2,135	—	1,082	

The 45 Officers of a Regiment of Native Infantry to be disposed of as follows:—

For Regimental duty	3 Field Officers 6 Captains 6 Lieutenants	15
For detached employ, Staff and Civil		13
Colonels of Battalions, in Europe		3
Average on furlough		5
Unemployed list		9
		45

III.—RETURN showing the Cost of the Troops on the Indian Establishment before the Mutiny and as proposed for the future.

Troops including Officers.	Establishment in 1857.	Annual cost of each Arm.	Total.	Troops including Officers.	Proposed Establishment.	Annual Cost of each Arm.	Total.
	Line Troops.	£	£	£	*Line Troops.*	£	£
2,936	Dragoons	369,152		24,530	European Infantry	1,879,742	1,879,742
24,530	Infantry	1,879,742					
			2,248,894				
	Local Troops.				*Local Troops.*		
7,260	European Artillery	726,000		14,396	European Artillery	1,439,600	
4,476	Native do.	313,320		1,902	Native do.	133,140	
4,851	Drivers and Lascars	77,028		3,752	Drivers and Lascars	42,480	
			1,116,348				1,615,220
3,385	Engineers and Sappers	188,000	188,000	3,775	Engineers and Sappers	211,000	
							211,000
10,078	Native Cavalry, Regular	1,026,678		7,370	Dragoons	844,600	
20,955	Do. do. Irregular	670,560		20,400	Native Cavalry, Sillidar	885,855	
			1,697,238				1,730,455
8,979	European Infantry	599,590		17,568	European Infantry	174,752	
150,040	Native do. Regular	3,797,171		143,550	Native Infantry, Regular	3,115,886	
35,215	Do. do. Irregular	516,000					
			4,912,761				4,290,638
272,705			£10,163,241	237,243			£9,727,055

1. The saving amounting to 436,186*l.* annually.
2. The cost of a regiment of dragoons of 701 men and 35 officers and staff is given by the Secretary at the India House, in 1831, at 73,788*l.* per annum, exclusive of charges for commissariat, clothing, barracks, military stores and hospital. I estimate these items at 20,000*l.* more, and deduct 15,000*l.* for difference of pay of officers on furlough and on garrison pay, leaving a total charge of 92,288*l.* for an entire regiment, or 125*l.* per man.
3. The cost of a regiment of local dragoons of the same strength would be the same, less excess of depôt and transport charges, which, calculated at the infantry rate, would amount to 7,528*l.* per regiment, leaving a total charge of 84,460*l.* per regiment, or 114*l.* 10*s.* per man.
4. I estimate the cost of European artillery soldiers, horse and foot, roughly at 100*l.* per man; of native artillery 70*l.*, including horses, &c. &c.; of drivers 20*l.*, and of lascars at 12*l.* per annum.
5. The cost of native regular cavalry, and of Sillidar horse, has been taken (the former, with a few necessary corrections) from an elaborate estimate in 1846 by the late Brigadier-General John Jacob; the heavy comparative charge, nearly 102*l.* per man, for the native regular cavalry arises from the disproportionate number of European officers to troopers.
6. The cost of European infantry has been taken from an East India House memorandum, with modifications nearly equalizing the number and grade of officers, the number and pay of men, and allowing 1,568*l.* per regiment for difference of pay of officers on furlough and garrison allowances. The entire charge for a line regiment of infantry by this calculation amounting to 85,446*l.*, or 76*l.* 5*s.* per man, and for a local regiment 73,422*l.*, or 66*l.* 10*s.* per man.
7. I have taken the cost of a regiment of native infantry, by calculating the pay of the officers, with the usual deduction for furlough and garrison allowances, and adding a round sum of 14,000*l.* for the native establishment, staff pay, &c. &c., making a total of 24,340*l.* per regiment per annum on the existing, and 20,772*l.* on the proposed establishment.
   The amount of mess allowance, 120 rupees per regiment per mensem, which may be reduced under the proposed system, should be applied to augmenting the pay of the native officers, who would also receive the company command allowance. A most important item in my proposed scheme, without which I conceive it must fail, is the extra allowance to officers attached to native battalions. I estimate this at about 700 rupees per battalion per mensem, or 126,000*l.* per annum for the entire native infantry of India, thus reducing the total amount of saving to 310,000*l.* per annum.
8. There are also two other important reforms suggested, the financial result of which will, I apprehend, balance each other. The one the conversion of all regimental majors into lieutenant-colonels, and of ensigns into lieutenants; the other the abolition of field allowances except when given to the men, but in such case to be sufficient to cover the actual cost of movement.

London, 9th February 1859. J. HOLLAND, Colonel.

I recommend that the changes in the organization of the Native cavalry and infantry above suggested be adopted at once in all the Presidencies. Opinions deserving of the highest respect, indeed, have been recorded in India in favour of abstaining for the present from any interference with the systems of the Madras and Bombay Armies,* and of confining ourselves to the reconstruction of that of Bengal; partly on the ground that, as the former have not revolted, any immediate change is unnecessary, and partly because allowing them to remain unaltered would be appreciated by the troops as a well-earned compliment to their fidelity. Any changes which would affect injuriously the interests of the armies, and which may not be absolutely necessary, ought undoubtedly to be avoided if possible, and those which may be deemed indispensable for remedying what is defective in their respective systems of discipline and government should be most cautiously introduced. But there need be no apprehension that the reforms which I

The changes proposed in the native cavalry and infantry should be adopted in all the Presidencies.

* Memorandum by Viscount Canning, para. 23, App. p. 58. Minute by Sir J. Outram, Sep. 30, 1858, App. p. 74.

advocate are of a nature to shock prejudices or create discontent; their effect would be altogether in an opposite direction; and I am confident that no measure would give so great satisfaction in the Madras and Bombay armies as the conversion of our Native cavalry regiments into Sillidar horse, the placing the command of troops and companies in the hands of native officers, and entrusting the command and management of all native corps to a small number of well-selected European officers, with superior emoluments. By equalizing the armies of the three Presidencies, as I have recommended in another part of this report, the native portion of those of Madras and Bombay would be secured against the reduction, with its consequent injurious stoppage of promotion, which will otherwise impend over them and must sooner or later be carried out; and if the Government of India should be of opinion that either or both of these measures are advisable on general grounds, they might be at once introduced with the best effect as boons expressive of Your Majesty's high appreciation of the loyalty they have evinced throughout the late crisis, and of the confidence reposed in their continued fidelity.

There is, however, another and most important argument in favour of the re-construction of the regular native cavalry and infantry corps in the manner proposed. It has been shown that the measure would add greatly to their efficiency and trustworthiness, and that, combined with the other changes suggested by Colonel Holland, while adding incalculably to the real strength of the Army, it would effect a saving of fully 300,000*l.* per annum.

"Whether any native artillery corps should be sanctioned." "The same question with regard to sappers and miners." Native artillery.

1670. 2267. 2769, 2770.

Artillery being so powerful an arm, and held, as it is known to be, in so great respect by the natives of India, the mass of it should undoubtedly be kept in European hands. There are, however, some districts in all the Presidencies where it is necessary to have artillery stationed, but where, from the unhealthiness of the climate, European troops could not be located without a great sacrifice of life. It will be required also for mountain warfare and occasional service with small detachments in the hot or rainy seasons, on which Europeans could not be employed without such sacrifice. A proportion of native artillery, sufficient to provide for such requirements, should therefore be maintained in each Presidency; excepting local artillery, which under some peculiar and exceptional cases it may be expedient to admit, it should be on the regular system; and to ensure it being always efficiently manned and composed of men of various castes and nationalities, the pay should be again made, as it was originally, superior to that of the infantry. Since the reduction in 1837 to the infantry rate, the difficulty in obtaining efficient men for the Golundauze battalions in the Bombay Presidency has been so great that it has been found absolutely necessary to recruit them almost entirely from the upper provinces of Bengal, and to admit men of a much inferior class, too, as regards physical capacity. When the pay was higher than in the infantry, not only was the recruiting more successful, but the infantry soldiers volunteered very freely for transfer to the Golundauze battalions, which thus obtained a great number of ready drilled men of the best description, and were in consequence easily maintained at their full complement.

2872. 2880. 2882. 2975 to 2980.

Sappers and miners.

2276. 2271.

With respect to sappers and miners, I am of opinion that in Iudia Europeans could not bear the work which is required from this branch of the service, except as instructors and directors in the non-commissioned grades;† and that as regards privates, the corps of sappers in all the Presidencies should be therefore composed as heretofore, entirely of natives. If exempted from camp conservancy duties, as the Madras and Bombay corps now are, and if the pay be again made, as it was formerly, superior to that of the infantry, there can be no doubt but that men of all castes would readily enlist into them in all the Presidencies as they now do in Bombay; and that, assisted with volunteers from the infantry, the several corps of sappers and miners would thus obtain men of superior physical capacity, as well as of various castes and nationalities, and would be maintained always at their full complement without difficulty.

2772 to 2782. 2823 to 2830.

I do not recommend a body of pioneers being attached to the sappers.‡ If the whole army were trained, as it ought to be, to the use of the spade and pickaxe, pioneers would not be wanted; and were a body of men under this designation attached to the sappers for camp conservancy duties, a mischievous distinction between high and low caste soldiers would be at once introduced. Such men as may be required for scavengering, and the other lower duties of camp conservancy, should be hired as occasion may require.

* Letter from Gen. Jacob to Col. Durand, June 7, 1858, para. 4. Gen. Jacob's reply to 3d question referred to him by the Commissioner in Scinde, June 5, 1858. Memorandum by Viscount Canning, para. 41, App. p. 59. Extracts from general remarks by Sir J. Lawson, &c. regarding artillery, para. 26.

† Memorandum by Col. Baker, Bengal engineers, Sep. 13, 1858, App. p. 19.

‡ Memorandum by Col. Baker, Bengal engineers, Sep. 13, 1858, App. p. 19.

The number of European non-commissioned officers should be considerably increased, for the purpose of supplying detached companies and camps of exercise with directors, in training the men of the regiments of the line, in digging trenches, and constructing roads and field works; and the non-commissioned staff of the corps should be placed on an equal footing in respect to emoluments with assistant overseers in the Department of Public Works, in order that they may not be losers, as they now are, by remaining with the corps, while many of their juniors of inferior qualifications and merit are employed with better salaries in that department.

European non-commissioned officers.

The number of European commissioned officers in the establishment of the corps of sappers should also be increased, and should consist of a commandant, a second in command, and general instructor in field practice, an adjutant, and a quartermaster. They should all be officers of the engineer corps, and placed, with respect to emoluments, on an equal footing with officers of corresponding rank and standing, holding the best paid appointments in the Department of Public Works. In the Bombay corps, the establishment of which consists only of a commandant and adjutant, the emoluments have hitherto been so inferior that these appointments, instead of being objects of ambition, as the interests of public service require they should be, have been generally avoided, and the command has been too often held in consequence by the least instead of the most efficient officers of the corps.

Commandant and European commissioned officers.

2801, 2802. 2804.

The total exclusion of natives from the scientific branches of the service, and from employment as artificers in the arsenals and laboratories of India, which at present finds everywhere so many advocates, is not practicable, and were it so, would be unnecessary. Forming so small a proportion as the requisite amount of native artillery and sappers would form to the entire army of each Presidency, and distributed as the companies would be to separate stations, a handful of Europeans could annihilate them at any moment; and native artificers, if excluded from the army laboratories, would assuredly find means of acquiring elsewhere the knowledge from which the advocates of their exclusion would debar them. Further, even at present the ordnance officers in India find it impossible to procure or retain anything like an adequate number of European skilled workmen, and an order prohibiting the employment of natives would be tantamount to shutting up the arsenals.

Native Artificers.

1135.

1133, 1134.

The best general system that can be adopted would be that of having each regiment composed of men of many different tribes, castes, and religions, taken from the entire population of each Presidency, permitting none to be excluded, and none to have any great preponderance in number; and of so mixing up the whole throughout the regiment, as to keep all the troops and companies as nearly equal as possible, in their relative numbers of each tribe and caste, in every grade. A small proportion, say one-fourth, should be allowed to be enlisted from the other Presidencies, in view to multiply the nationalities, the actual recruiting ground in each being at present confined, by the distaste of the native population generally for military service, to particular districts of comparatively small extent.

"Whether the native army should be composed of different nationalities or castes, and if so, in what proportion?

Caste.

1185. 1193. 1201, 1202. 1213 to 1215. 2307.

I recommend, therefore, that this system be established in all the Presidencies, and in all branches of the service; that commanding officers be allowed no discretion in the matter; and that any regiments, which the Government of either Presidency may deem it expedient to have organized upon a different system, be regarded as exceptional. The various other plans for the composition or native regiments which have been suggested may be found better suited for local corps, and for other irregulars, raised principally among the tribes on the Punjaub frontier; but for the native army in general, I feel confident, would not work so well.

1203.

The great importance of having not only the native army as a body, but each regiment in particular, composed of men of many nationalities, castes, and religions, has been sufficiently shown in the late mutiny. In the Bengal Army, indeed, no option was left to regimental commanders, a predilection for high caste having led the Government of India, almost from the first, to establish and maintain the system of excluding all low-caste men from its ranks. The effect of this system was, that in 1852, according to the evidence given by Mr. Melvill, before the House of Lords, two-thirds of the Bengal Native Infantry were composed of Brahmins and Rajpoots, affording thus a most dangerous facility for general combination, and tending greatly to weaken discipline by the undue deference to caste among the European officers, and pride of caste among the native ranks which it fostered. Even so lately as in 1855, in the revised Bengal Military Regulations, commanding officers of corps are directed to

3855

3156 to 3159. 2888, 2889.

take special care to reject all men of the inferior castes, and 13 are expressly particularised for exclusion. In the Bombay Army, the regulation which required officers commanding regiments to confine their recruiting within the limits of the Presidency was allowed to remain for many years a dead letter; and under a growing predilection for the taller and handsomer class of recruits obtained from Hindoostan, large numbers of men from the upper provinces of Bengal were constantly enlisted, till, in the year 1848, the numbers had obtained in many corps so large a proportion, and in some so dangerous a preponderance, that the Commander-in-chief was induced to move the Government to adopt measures for gradually reducing them to a minimum. Of the two Bombay regiments which were found seriously implicated in the late mutiny, about two-thirds of the 21st were men enlisted from the upper provinces of Bengal, and a still larger proportion of the 27th were men enlisted from the Sauent Warree and adjoining districts, where this corps was raised in 1846, where shortly before that period there had been a serious insurrection, and much disaffection still prevails, and where the regiment unfortunately happened to be stationed at the time of the outbreak.

2871.
2882, 2883.

All castes should be placed upon a perfect equality. No preference should be shown towards any on the part of Government or of the European officers; and care should be taken by a fair proportionate distribution among them in every regiment, of promotion and all other advantages, to prevent them from supposing that any such preference exists. All just consideration should be shown by the Government and by the European officers to the feelings of every class, by carefully avoiding all interference with their caste and religious usages; but there is no service or duty in the Army which the highest caste soldier cannot perform without any real sacrifice of his caste and religious principles, and the plea of caste, therefore, need not and never should be admitted, for a moment, as an excuse for hesitating to undertake, or omitting to perform any service or duty on which he may be ordered. Although it is known that in the Madras and Bombay Armies the highest and lowest castes (including among the former men from Hindoostan, from the same villages and of the same families as those who lately formed the mass of the Bengal Army), the Brahmin, the Mahratta, the Dher, and the Parwarree, are seen in the ranks shoulder to shoulder, and even sleep in the same tent, "without scruple or thought of objection."* The majority of the officers consulted in the Bengal Presidency † appears still to consider that the Madras and Bombay system of altogether ignoring caste is not practicable in the Bengal Army. They would, therefore, still exclude men of low caste from its ranks,‡ or form them into separate corps, as has been done in the Punjaub, where two regiments have been recently raised, entirely composed of Moozubbees (Sweepers). But the fact above stated with respect to the Madras and Bombay Armies is indisputable, and, as it appears to me, far outweighs the arguments adduced against the adoption of the same system in the Bengal Presidency.

2547, 2548.
2884 to 2889.
1018 to 1025.
1678.
2310 to 2315.
2321 to 2324.
2341. 2781.
3636. 6244.
5535 to 5539.
6244.

"Whether the native army is to be enlisted under a new code." Terms of enlistment.

All enlistments into the Native armies of India should be for general and unlimited service in and beyond India. This rule has always obtained in the Bombay Army, and although there is a full proportion of high caste men in its ranks, and it has frequently been called upon to furnish troops for service beyond sea, no regiment, as far as I am aware, has ever failed to obey promptly the order to proceed on such service. Nor has the liability to be sent beyond sea caused any difficulty in keeping its ranks complete, and there appears, therefore, no reason to doubt but that the same rule might be extended to the other Presidencies with equal success. It may seem carrying the principle over far to insist upon the whole of the Indian Army being enlisted for service beyond sea, when not a tenth part of it can ever be required for such service; but the false position in which the Government has been constantly placed under the volunteering systems which have hitherto obtained in the Bengal and Madras Armies, in having to regard their performance of such service as matter of favour; the breach of good faith involved in the Government § endeavouring to compel non-volunteer corps to proceed on foreign service, and indirectly punishing the men in the event of their refusing, although not bound by the terms of their enlistment so to serve; and the deep injury to the discipline of regiments resulting from the men thus having legitimate ground for refusing to obey the orders of the Commander-in-Chief and Government, renders it absolutely necessary that the Bombay system should be extended throughout the armies of the other Presidencies.

765, 766.
2341.
2343 to 2345.
2447 to 2471.
2474, 2475.

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* Mutinies in Oude, by Mr. R. Gubbins, 1848, pp. 88, 89.
† Précis of replies to questions having reference to native infantry of the Bengal army. Questions 1 & 2, App. p. 179.
‡ Replies by Maj.-Gen. Birch, Military Secretary to Government of India. "Infantry," question 8, App. p. 182.
§ Memorandum by Lieut.-Gen. Sir Patrick Grant, dated June 29, 1857, App. p. 140.

One fixed scale of garrison pay, batta when in the field or marching in India, and foreign service rations or money allowance in lieu, when employed beyond sea, or in the countries beyond the British frontier, should be established for each branch of the service and for all the Presidencies. The batta should be fixed at an amount fully sufficient to meet the extra expenses incurred for carriage, and by the additional wear and tear of clothing and necessaries, and should be granted to the men whenever it is allowed to the European officers. Pay, batta, &c. 1317. 2348. 2351, 2352. 2354.

The regulation under which additional pay, at the rate of one rupee a month after 16, and two rupees after 20 years' service, is at present allowed to all privates of the line, if well conducted, should be prospectively rescinded; and, in lieu, good-conduct pay, at the rate of one rupee after 7, two after 14, and three after 21 years' service, should be allowed to 100 privates in each regiment of Infantry, and to a number bearing the same proportion in all other corps of the line (regular and irregular) of lower strength, to be conferred by the commanding officer of each regiment upon those privates of each class who, by a long continued course of good conduct, and a zealous performance of their duty, may be, in his opinion, most deserving of the reward; the men to wear a good-conduct badge for each reward conferred, and to retain the good-conduct pay which they may have held for five years, in addition to their pension, but to be subject to be deprived of it while serving, by order of the commanding officer of the regiment, for misconduct. 2350. 2353.

The number of each class to be:—

45 Third class, at 1 rupee, per mensem.
35 Second class, at 2 ,, ,,
20 First class, at 3 ,, ,,

The pay of the native commissioned ranks (especially that of jemidar), and the staff pay of the subdar major and native adjutant, should be considerably increased, and one fixed rate should be be established for subadars as well as jemidars, instead of having the former (as at present) divided into three classes, with rates of pay increasing with length of service. Superior zeal and fidelity in the performance of duty, combined with good conduct, and not mere length of service, should form the principle on which increased honours and emoluments are made attainable to native officers and soldiers. Under the operation of the former, a general stimulus to zeal and fidelity is infused into all ranks: under that of the latter zeal flags, and the army is burdened with numbers of superannuated men in every grade. 2372 to 2374.

The invalid pension regulations should be revised. The period of service giving claim to half-pay rates of pension should be increased frem 15 to 31 years, and the period entitling to full-pay rates should be reduced from 40 to 35 years. On the completion of 38 years' service, all ranks should be entitled to be transferred to the pension list at their own request, and should be liable to be so transferred by Government whether they desire it or not, at the recommendation of officers commanding regiments, upon the half-pay rates of pension, without being passed as unfit by medical committees. When non-commissioned officers or soldiers are discharged from the army solely on account of ill health, before they have completed the period of service which entitles to pensions, they should be allowed gratuities, agreeably to the practice obtaining in the Bombay Presidency. Pensions. 2346. 2385 to 2388.

All native soldiers should be made liable, by the terms of their enlistment, to be ordered on working parties, whether in garrison or in the field, without extra pay; and every regiment should be regularly trained in the use of the spade, pickaxe, and barrow, and frequently employed upon field-works, as well as in the ordinary work of leveling ground in the vicinity of the camp or lines, making roads, constructing butts for target practice, &c. in view to accustom all ranks to these duties, which they should be led to regard as being equally honourable with those they have to perform under arms. Working parties.

All particulars regarding pay and other allowances and pensions as fixed by the regulation, also the liability to be employed on working parties, and to be sent on service beyond sea, should be carefully explained to every recruit in the presence of the commanding officer of the regiment, previous to his being enlisted; and a distinct pledge to proceed on service beyond sea, or wherever ordered, should be included in the oath or contract of fidelity. Perfect good faith should be observed on the part of the Government with respect to the terms of enlistment; but all cases of regiments or individual soldiers refusing to abide by them, or even hesitating to obey when ordered to perform any service, should be treated as crimes of the gravest character, and promptly punished. 1206. 1210. 2355.

2343. 2347. 3096 to 3098.

I advocate enlistment for unlimited service, and the retention of the pension regulations, as affording a valuable security for the general fidelity of the native army. Among the changes suggested by those who have been consulted in the Bengal Presidency* are enlistment for limited service (ten years), and the abolition of the existing pension systems, for which it is proposed to substitute the grant of gratuities, or small pensions, only to men of uniformly good conduct, after completing certain fixed periods of service. But the advantages anticipated from these alterations would be much more than counterbalanced by the disadvantages. The native soldiers, instead of regarding the service as affording them a life provision and making their regiment their home, as the Madras and Bombay sepoys now do,† would feel their tenure of it to be at best but precarious, and their tie to the Government only temporary; the State would be liable to lose their services just when of the age and standing to be most efficient, and large numbers of men trained to arms would be continually cast upon the country, without the means of obtaining their livelihood, and discontented with the Government which made no adequate provision for them.

7063, 7064.

2411. 2465. 7065 to 7068.

2353.

"Whether the Bengal Army ought not to be divided into two or more armies." Equalization of the armies of all the Presidencies.

The Bengal Army is much too large, and is spread over too great an extent of country for efficient control and superintendence. Its immense size and union under one head have always had the evil effect of facilitating a much more extensive and dangerous combination than could possibly have taken place had the same extent of territory been garrisoned by two separate armies, each under a commander-in-chief of its own, which has been sufficiently proved by the Madras and Bombay Armies not having joined in the late mutiny. Had such been the arrangement, in all probability each would have been recruited principally within its own districts and, like the Madras and Bombay Armies, would have had differences in its composition and system of government, which would have similarly lessened very considerably the facilities for combination between the two.‡

1391 to 1304. 5512.

1297. 5520. 3101 to 3193. 5385.

3175 to 3178. 3180. 3181. 3186.

1309. 2038 to 2067. 3197 to 3202.

1310 to 1312. 2341. 5308.

Another evil effect, resulting from the immense size of the Bengal Army and its union under one head, has been, that it has held a fixed and most undeserved position of superiority with the Government of India, which has not only shown it undue favour by placing almost all classes of its officers, by means of a larger proportion of full batta stations, and a higher scale of allowances for staff and other detached appointments, on a much superior footing to those of the minor Presidencies, but has regarded it as a model on which to mould the other armies, not unfrequently negativing suggestions, submitted by the Commander-in-Chief of the latter,§ for improving their efficiency, upon the sole ground of the particular measure proposed not according with the system obtaining in Bengal. This has probably resulted in a great measure from the circumstance of the Commander-in-Chief in India being also the Commander-in-Chief of the Bengal army, and of all the principal appointments immediately under him and the government of India being held by officers of that army, who may reasonably be supposed to have been prepossessed in favour of their own system, and whose official influence has doubtless had great weight with those high authorities. But the consequence has assuredly been most disastrous, and the only effectual remedy for the evils above pointed out will be found in making the armies of all the Presidencies as nearly as possible equal in size, and entirely so in all other respects. In order to carry this fully out, the Commander-in-Chief of each army should be made perfectly independent of the others. Although it is almost desirable that uniformity should be maintained in all,‖ with respect to pay and allowances of every kind, pensions, and the systems of promotion and field exercise, it is equally so that much diversity should be allowed with regard to all minor matters in view, to afford in each a safe field for testing the value of changes which may be suggested from time to time for improving their respective systems of organization and discipline, and to foster that emulation and rivalry between the three armies, which cannot but tend to promote the efficiency of them all. It is obvious that if placed under the supreme command of the Bengal Commander-in-Chief. He would be generally led to regard his own army as a model one,¶ and be constantly tempted to exercise his authority to bring the Madras and Bombay systems into conformity with that of Bengal, in matters wherein diversity would be more advantageous to the public service.

5286 to 5289.

1297. 5291. 5292.

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* Reply of Punjaub committee to question 10. "Organization," "Native Infantry," App. p. 212.
† Minute by Sir J. Outram, Sept. 30, 1858, App. p. 74.
‡ "The Indian Revolt." By Maj.-Gen. Tucker, 3rd Edition, p. 13.
§ Note to Memorandum by Major Merewether on the construction of the Scinde Horse, App. p. 12.
‖ Précis of replies to questions referring to the Native Infantry Bengal army, question 21, App. p. 186.
¶ Letter from General Jacob to Sir C. Trevelyan, dated March 24, 1858, paras. 14 and 18.

Assuming, however, that the native force for the whole of India will henceforth be smaller by about 80,000 men than before the mutiny,* the reduction of the Bengal Native Army within reasonable dimension would not involve the necessity of dividing it into two by constituting a fourth Presidency; because, by proportionately augmenting that of Bombay, by incorporating in it the requisite amount of Bengal troops, the three armies might be equalized, and each made of a convenient size for ensuring its efficient supervision and control. The whole of the European artillery, cavalry, and infantry which it may be necessary to raise, in augmentation of the present local force in India, should be officered from the armies of the three Presidencies, by throwing the whole of the officers of each branch into one list for the purpose. This would be the most just arrangement for all, as giving each army an equal share of the promotion consequent on the augmentation. It would have the farther advantage of bringing into the heart of the Bengal army a large number, of all ranks, trained in the Armies of Madras and Bombay, an arrangement that would greatly facilitate the introduction of those changes which are essential in its systems of organization and discipline.

1180, 1181. 1306 to 1380. 1313, 1314.

6311.

Objections would probably be raised to the mode of equalizing the three Armies above proposed, as well as to the measure itself, and doubtless some cases of individual hardship would be involved in its adoption; but such cases necessarily attend all great changes in established systems; and if the Government should be of opinion that, by enabling it always to keep in the upper provinces considerable bodies of Madras and Bombay troops, composed principally of men from Southern India, who have no sympathies in common with the northern tribes; by diminishing the facilities for extensive combination in future; by ensuring an equally efficient supervision and control over each of the three armies; and by substituting a generous spirit of emulation for the jealousy and heart-burning which undue favour for the army of Bengal has hitherto fostered between it and the other two, their equalization would materially strengthen its hands in restoring and maintaining the peace of the country, and conduce greatly to the future efficiency and well-being of the entire native army—the present opportunity for carrying out this measure ought not to be lost. A sure and considerable advantage in promotion would be gained by the great majority of the officers, which would doubtless reconcile them to the unusual mode of making the augmentation; and any exceptional cases in which officers might satisfy the Government that they had sustained positive injury by the measure might be met by conferring on them some other benefit to compensate for the loss, and should be dealt with in the most liberal spirit.

1221. 1302. 1304. 3193. 5518. 5520. 6520. 6523. 3186. 3196. 4915, 496.

With respect to the particular districts in the Bengal Presidency which, in the event of the three armies being equalized, it would be most expedient to make over to Madras and Bombay respectively, the best general arrangement would be, I think, to assign to the Madras army the country south of the Chumbul River, leaving Mhow, Neemuch, and Nusserabad as at present in charge of the Bombay Army, and giving to the latter the occupation of the entire Punjaub† which, from its geographical position and facilities of water communication, can be most conveniently supplied with troops and stores from Bombay. By this arrangement the 75th parallel of longitude would very nearly delineate the eastern boundary of the Bombay Presidency, while a line drawn from Gwalior to a point somewhere between Cuttach and Calcutta would mark the north-eastern frontier for the Madras Army; the occupation of Arracan and Pegu being either divided between the Bengal and Madras Armies, or assigned to whichever of the two can most conveniently garrison them.

1180, 1181. 1313, 1314.

Under this head, the inquiry instituted by the Commissioners has been extended to all the powers of reward and punishment which has been hitherto, or ought to be in future, vested in officers commanding native regiments. It is upon the sufficiency and judicious exercise of these powers that the Government must principally depend, for the maintenance of that perfect discipline, without which no army can be either efficient or trustworthy; and the fatal policy of reducing them to a minimum has been only too fully illustrated in the case of the Bengal Native Army, in which, by the system established by the Commander-in-Chief and Government of India, commanding officers of regiments had been, in respect to this matter, reduced to cyphers, and the maintenance of sound discipline, even by commanders of the highest ability, had been rendered absolutely impossible. Under that system, commanding officers of regiments were strictly prohibited‡

"Whether any change is required in the system of promotion as regard native commissioned and non-commissioned officers."

Powers of commanding officers of regiments.

* Scheme for reorganizing the Indian army, by Brig.-Gen. J. Jacob, para. 6, App. p. 207.
† General Jacobs' replies to questions referred to him by the Commissioners in Scinde.
‡ General regulations of the Bengal army, 1855.

from enlisting any but men of high caste; pride of caste, instead of pride of good soldiership being thereby fostered alike both in officers and men, and every regiment composed almost exclusively of Brahmins and Rajpoots,* enlisted from the same districts, and forming a brotherhood, which greatly facilitated combination for evil, and extended through the entire army—were deprived of the principal means of rewarding merit, by being compelled to make promotions in all the native ranks by seniority,† instead of by selection for efficiency,‡ and to grant leave of absence § (which for any longer period than 30 days required the sanction of superior authority) according to the regimental roster; and were so completely stripped of all power to punish, upon their own authority alone, that private soldiers were allowed to claim a court-martial at their option, on their commanding officer awarding a punishment of only a few days' drill, and to forward written complaints against him *direct* to the Commander-in-Chief.‖ What wonder that, under such a system, even with a body of European officers, who, by their noble conduct throughout that fearful storm of mutiny which lately swept the Bengal Presidency from one extremity to the other, have set an example of heroism and devotion to duty to all the armies in the world, the bond of discipline was at length found to have been reduced to a thread, and that the whole fabric of the Bengal Native Army fell to pieces at once, under the first shock of the outbreak at Meerut!

3156 to 3159. 3180. 3187. 5385. 1344, 1345. 3089. 3187. 1851. 1856. 251. 254. 366. 371. 600. 608. 613. 809, 810. 811. 1496 1512, 1513. 1536. 1818 to 1820. 1829 to 1831. 2393. 5245.

The true principle, and the only one that will secure the maintenance of sound discipline in a regiment, is to place at the head of it an officer of undoubted qualifications for the command; to give him large powers of reward and punishment,¶ together with a generous confidence in his right use of them, and to place no further check upon their free exercise than that resulting from a general but vigilant supervision and control on the part of the superior authorities; such supervision and control to be exercised mainly with reference to the results, with as little interference as possible with the details producing them. A principle the very reverse of this, has hitherto been acted on. Officers have succeeded to the command of regiments solely in virtue of their seniority in rank; and to this system, which has continually placed many incompetent officers in these commands, is to be attributed the constant tendency that appears to have existed on the part of the several Commanders-in-Chief to abridge their power, and to fetter them in its exercise. From the instructions recently sent to India, however, by the Home Government, it may be assumed, that in future all appointments to the command of native regiments will be made by selection for superior qualifications alone; and upon this assumption,** I recommend that the following powers of reward and punishment be vested in all officers commanding native regiments in the three Presidencies, viz.:—

1235 to 1237. 3079. 5470. 789. 1237, 1238. 1253. 5466.

They should have power to enlist and to promote, upon their own authority alone, as regards all the non-commissioned ranks, to select for all promotions to and in the commission grade, and for the appointments of subadar-major and native adjutant, to appoint to the command of troops and companies, and in cavalry regiments to bestow asamees by selection from the entire list of native commissioned officers; and to confer good conduct badges, with additional pay, by selection from the entire list of privates of each class. Further, they should have power to select for appointment to the "Order of British India," and to the "Order of Merit," when the service in action, which gives claim to the latter, is performed under their own immediate command; also for appointments in the police force, and any other branches of the service, civil or military, which the Government may open to the native ranks of the army. They should have, further, the sole power of granting leave of absence in time of peace to all the native ranks.

They should have power, upon their own authority alone, to reduce and to discharge, as regards all non-commissioned officers and soldiers, and to inflict upon privates the minor punishments at present authorized by the 112th Article of War, to which should be added corporal punishment not exceeding 50 lashes, for insubordination or insolence to a superior officer, and for other offences against discipline, in cases which may appear to require an immediate example. They should also have power, at their discretion, to bring non-commissioned officers and soldiers to trial before regimental courts-martial, and to dispose of

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* Mutinies in Oude, by M. R. Gubbins, 1858, pp. 88 to 90.
† General regulations of the Bengal Army, 1855, pp. 397 to 400.
‡ Précis of replies to question 1, "Bengal Native Infantry," "Promotion," App. p. 193.
§ General Regulations of the Bengal Army, 1855, pp. 344 to 349.
‖ Memorandum by Sir P. Grant, June 29, 1857, App. p. 140.
¶ Brig.-Gen. Jacob's replies to questions 5 and 6 "Infantry, Bombay Army." Brigadier Coke's reply to question 9, "Native Infantry, Bengal Army," App. p. 183.
** Reply of Punjaub Committee to question 11, "Bengal Native Infantry," "Promotion," App. p. 212.

each case, upon their own authority alone, for offences against discipline which may appear to require a more severe punishment than they are themselves empowered to inflict. Further, they should have power to recommend to the Commander-in-Chief the removal to the pension establishment, or a minimum amount of pension, or from the service altogether, any native commissioned officer who either by continued negligent performance of his duty, or by falling into intemperate or other disreputable habits, may become a burthen or a disgrace to his regiment.

Honorary commands for native commissioned officers.

It is highly desirable that the Government should establish in each Presidency a certain proportionate number of honorary commands to be filled by distinguished and meritorious native officers selected from the army, upon the same system as that which was established many years ago in the Bombay presidency, on the particular recommendation of the late Sir John Malcolm, and maintained until 1838, in which year these commands, so well calculated to foster zeal and fidelity on the part of the commissioned ranks, were abolished.

Articles of war.

It is also highly desirable that the rules under which justice by courts-martial is at present administered in the native army should be at once revised and simplified,* and especially so that the forms of proceeding should be cleared from all law technicalities † which serve only to puzzle and confuse the minds of the uneducated class of officers of which such courts are composed, and to defeat the ends of justice. The native mind is not a whit less acute than the European, and if left to follow pretty much their own way of examining witnesses, and of sifting evidence, as under their own simpler system of punchayets, these officers would be much better enabled to form a just decision, whatever might be the case submitted to their investigation. I recommend, therefore, that for all military offences which the Government may consider expedient to include within the jurisdiction of regimental courts-martial, the forms of proceeding be assimilated, as nearly as may be, to those of punchayets; and that all offences considered of too grave a character to be therein included be placed in two other categories, and made cognizable before district or garrison and general courts-martial respectively, to be composed partly of European and partly of native officers, except in special cases in which the officers respectively empowered to convene such courts may consider it best for the interests of the public service to order them to be composed wholly of Europeans. The offences which may be classed as military, and the kinds and amount of punishment which each description of court may be empowered to award, should be briefly and closely set forth; and I strongly recommend that the amount of corporal punishment be increased from fifty lashes for every description of court, as at present, to 200 for regimental and 300 for district or garrison courts; excluding this kind of punishment altogether, in future, from the category of those awardable by general courts-martial.

7058 to 7061.

1637.

System of promotion.

1336 to 1338. 3081. 3089 to 3093. 7049 to 7051.

The system of promotion should be that of selection by regimental commanders, for merit and efficiency alone, in all ranks from private to subadar-major. The promotions to the several non-commissioned grades should be made by regimental commanders‡ on their own authority, subject only to the control resulting from it being made the duty of brigadiers and generals of division, at their periodical inspections, to examine into the promotions made, and to report as to the general efficiency of the non-commissioned officers in each grade. Regimental commanders should avail themselves, at their discretion, of the assistance of officers commanding troops and companies, in making their selections, but the responsibility for the fitness of the men promoted should be held to rest, in all cases, with themselves alone.

"The seniority system, so far from being just, is the greatest possible injustice to the "really deserving men, while it holds out the greatest possible encouragement to the "lazy, the idle, and the good-for-nothing. Throw everything open to fair competition, "and let the best man win. This is the style of justice which sepoys and all other "men really like best in their hearts. Let there be no favouritism, but let the "European officers honestly and continually endeavour to choose the *best* men for "promotion, and the best possible feeling will assuredly be created and maintained "between them and their native soldiers."§

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* Lord Ellenborough's reply to question 7, August 24, 1858, App. p. 6.

† Replies of Punjaub committee, Maj.-Gen. Birch and Col. Young, to questions 1 and 3, "Military code and rules of discipline," App. pp. 191, 193.

‡ Précis of replies to question 11, "Bengal Native Infantry," "Promotion," App. p. 212.

§ Brig.-Gen. Jacob's reply to question 9, "Bombay Infantry," "Promotion."

The names of the men selected for promotion from the non-commissioned to the commissioned grade, and from one commissioned grade to another, should be transmitted *direct* to army head-quarters, for the Commander-in-Chief's approval, accompanied with a full statement of qualifications, services, and general character. No report should be required regarding those passed over.

Leave of absence.

The system with respect to leave of absence should be that of placing the power of granting it in the hands of regimental commanders alone,* and of making it fully understood by all the native ranks that they can obtain it only as matter of indulgence and not of right. The maximum number of all ranks permitted to be absent at one time, also the maximum period for which leave may be granted, should be fixed by Government regulations, and the full number should be allowed to be absent throughout the year; but with these exceptions, regimental commanders should be left free from restriction in respect to details, and from all interference on the part of officers commanding stations and divisions.

Petitions and appeals.

Petitions, complaints, and appeals on the part of non-commissioned officers and soldiers to the superior authorities, should of course be permitted, but only from individual men, and through the channel of regimental commanders; and all cases in which these rules may be wilfully transgressed, or in which the complaint or appeal may be found to be groundless or frivolous, should be severely punished.

The powers which I have recommended to be conferred upon regimental commanders may perhaps be regarded by some officers as unnecessarily large, and the fear lest they should be abused to purposes of undue favour or oppression will not improbably deter others also from concurring in my recommendation. Doubtless, after every possible security has been taken for having none but the best qualified officers in the command of regiments, cases would occur in which such officers would disappoint the expectations formed of them, and fail in ability to exercise their authority with advantage to the public service, or abuse their high trust under the influence of unworthy motives; but such cases would assuredly form but rare exceptions; and I am myself fully convinced, from my own ledge of the native character, acquired during an actual residence in India of about 31 years, of which about 18 were passed with a native regiment, that the European system of regimental government, especially as regards the very limited power given to the commanding officer, is most unsuitable to the native mind; that the stronger his hand is made by the Government in native corps, the less necessity will there be for actual punishment; and that the more completely all ranks are led to look up to him alone for advancement and honour, as the reward of zealous and faithful service, and for degradation and prompt punishment as the sure consequence of misconduct, the stronger will be the bond of sound discipline in every regiment, and the greater therefore the security to the Government for the efficiency and trustworthiness of the native army.

After the terrible events which have recently occurred in India, it will probably appear to very many persons worse than idle to argue, as I have done, that the native army may deserve, and ought again to receive the full confidence of the Government. I must not omit to remark, therefore, that the confidence for which I contend is not that blind trust which led to the Bengal presidency, from Calcutta to Meerut, being left in the early part of the year 1857,† almost denuded of European troops, and to the principal arsenals and treasuries being placed under the sole charge of native guards; but the reasonable confidence which, with a just equipoise of European force throughout the country, and in possession of all the principal arsenals and treasuries, might well be accorded to a native army well organized, disciplined, and governed, and kept in its own proper subordinate position, as an auxiliary to the European force.

1136. 1141.

Having quoted so largely, in support of my own views, from the opinions recorded by the late General Jacob, I think it is necessary to observe that I have done so because, although more eminent names may possibly be found among those who have given evidence on the same side, yet no man living has had the opportunities of testing, through a long series of years, as he has done, the correctness of his theories, and of proving their value in practice.

I humbly submit this Report for Your Majesty's consideration. It may seem presumptuous in me to have set my individual views in opposition to those adopted by the majority of my colleagues, to have entered so minutely into details, and to have recorded

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* Bombay Army Regulations, Jameson's code, 1850, pp. 388, 389.
† India House returns.

definite opinions upon some of the more important and difficult subjects with respect to which they have declared their inability to arrive at any satisfactory conclusion, or to offer any recommendation. But in the Commission issued by Your Majesty we were expressly "commanded" and "required" to report our opinion upon all the questions therein particularized, to report also "what changes it would be expedient to make in the organization," and "the best means of securing the efficiency" of the army lately serving in the pay and under the control of the East India Company. I therefore considered it my duty fully to obey Your Majesty's commands; and having passed a lifetime in studying most of these questions in the country and among the soldiers to which they relate, and having formed, with the aid of the evidence taken by the Commission, very decided opinions upon them, it seemed to me that no option remained with me but to lay them, with all their imperfections, as I do now with all humility, before Your Majesty.

H. HANCOCK, Major-General,
Bombay Army.

London, March 5, 1859.

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